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CAMERAS IN THE COURTROOM

It is desirable that the trial of causes should take place under
the public eye, not because the controversies of one citizen
with another are of public concern, but because it is of the
highest moment that those who administer justice should always act under the sense of public responsibility, and that
every citizen should be able to satisfy himself with his own
eyes as to the mode in which public duty is performed.
-Justice

Oliver Wendell Holmes1

Our courtroom is an open courtroom: the public and the press
are there routinely, and since today television is part of the
press, I have a hard time seeing why it shouldn't be there too
-Justice Potter Stewart'

I
Introduction
In October 1984, Ted Turner's Cable News Network (CNN) 3
petitioned the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
New York to permit live television coverage of the trial of General William Westmoreland's libel suit against CBS.4 The court

denied the petition,5 citing a local rule of court prohibiting televised trial coverage from inside the courtroom.6 The Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed,7 rejecting CNN's argument that the rule violated the first amendment to the
1. Cowley v. Pulsifer, 137 Mass. 392, 394 (1884).
2. Justice Stewart Retires, 67 A.B.A.J. 954, 954 (1981).
3. Cable News Network (CNN) is a 24-hour cable television news network subsidiary of the Turner Broadcasting Co. of Atlanta, Georgia. Westmoreland v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 752 F.2d 16, 18 n.1 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct.
3478 (1985).
4. Westmoreland v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., No. 82 Civ. 7913 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 19, 1984). See also infra note 106.
5. Westmoreland v. CBS, Inc., 596 F. Supp. 1166 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
6. General Rule 7 provides:
The taking of photographs and the use of recording devices in the courtroom or its environs, except by officials of the court in the conduct of the
court's business, or radio or television broadcasting from the courtroom or its
environs, during the progress of or in connection with judicial proceedings,
including proceedings before a United States Magistrate, whether or not the
court is actually in session, is prohibited.
S.D.N.Y. GEN R. 7.
7. Westmoreland v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 752 F.2d 16 (2d Cir. 1984).
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United States Constitution' as applied to the Westmoreland
case.' In two recent criminal trials involving alleged misconduct of public officials,' 0 other federal courts of appeals have
similarly upheld rules banning television cameras from the
courtroom.
Despite the exclusion of television cameras in these three
cases, the question of electronic access" to judicial proceedings
remains unresolved. In this context, the issue of the proper
balance between rights of a free press and3 the right to a fair
14
2
trial implicates the first, fifth, sixth, and fourteenth
amendments to the United States Constitution. Yet while the
issue has generated an abundance of commentary, 15 it still re8. The first amendment states, in pertinent part, "Congress shall make no law
...abridging the freedom of speech or of the press." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
9. See infra notes 117-35 and accompanying text.
10. On trial in those cases were federal district court judge Alcee Hastings,
charged with conspiracy and obstruction of justice, United States v. Hastings, 695 F.2d
1278 (11th Cir. 1983), discussed infra notes 93-104 and accompanying text, and Louisiana Governor Edwin Edwards, charged with fraud and racketeering, United States v.
Edwards, 785 F.2d 1293 (5th Cir. 1986), discussed infra notes 136-40 and accompanying
text.
11. The terms "electronic access," "access," "electronic coverage" or "coverage,"
when used without further qualification, will denote the use of television, radio, still
or motion picture photography to record and/or transmit judicial proceedings from
inside the courtroom.
12. The fifth amendment states, in pertinent part, "No person shall be... de" U.S. CONST.
prived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ..
amend V.
13. The sixth amendment states, in pertinent part, "In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right to a . . . public trial." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
Whether a right of electronic access to the courtroom should be recognized under the
sixth amendment is beyond the scope of this Note. The Supreme Court rejected an
asserted sixth amendment right to broadcast trials in Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 53839 (1965); id. at 583-84 (Warren, C.J., concurring); id. at 588-89 (Harlan, J., concurring). See also United States v. Kerley, 753 F.2d 617, 620 (7th Cir. 1985); In re Petition
of Post-Newsweek Stations, Florida, Inc., 370 So.2d 764, 774 (1979). But see Note,
Cameras in the Criminal Courtroom: A Sixth Amendment Analysis, 85 COLUM. L.
REV. 1546 (1985) [hereinafter Cameras in the Criminal Courtroom].
14. The fourteenth amendment states, in pertinent part, "No State shall... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ... ." U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
15. The question of televised coverage of trials has drawn considerable debate. In
support of television coverage of judicial proceedings, see Davis, Television in Our
Court&" The Proven Advantages, The Unproven Dangers, 64 JUDICATURE 85 (1980);
Nevas, The Case ForCamerasin the Courtroom, 20 JUDGES J. 22 (Winter 1981); Tornquist & Grifall, Television in the Courtroom, Devil or Saint?,17 WILLAME'rE L. REV.
345 (1981); Weinstein & Zimmerman, Let The People Observe Their Courts,61 JUDICATuRE 156 (1977); Wilson, Justice in Living Color: The Case For Courtroom Television,
60 A.B.A.J. 294 (1974); Zimmerman, OvercomingFuture Shock- Estes Revisited, or a
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quires a thorough judicial evaluation in light of Supreme Court
precedent and modern technological and societal conditions.
This Note first reviews the evolution of print and electronic
coverage of courtroom proceedings. Next, it discusses the
Supreme Court's rejection of the claim that permitting television coverage of a criminal trial over the defendant's objection
violates his constitutional right to due process of law. Then,
using the Westmoreland case as one example, this Note examines the current limitations on electronic access to the federal
courts and concludes that inflexible rules which prohibit television coverage of trials are no longer legally defensible. Neither
the Supreme Court decisions which have been interpreted to
hold to the contrary, nor the "time, place or manner" doctrine," can continue to justify per se exclusion.
This Note also summarizes the relevant policy considerations
asserted by advocates and opponents of electronic trial coverage and relied on by the courts. A survey of the effects of electronic access on state courts demonstrates that the fears of
opponents are largely unfounded. Finally, drawing from a sample of successful experimental programs conducted by various
states, this Note sets forth a proposal designed to test the contours of and promulgate guidelines for the broadcasting of trials from inside federal and state courtrooms.
II
Historical Overview of Trial Coverage by Print
and Electronic Media
A.

Pre-Television Coverage of Judicial Proceedings

The deleterious effects of media access to the courtroom
were felt long before the introduction of television. 17 For exModest Proposalfor the ConstitutionalProtectionof the News-GatheringProcess, 1980
DUKE L.J. 641 (1980).
In opposition, see Day, The Case Against Cameras in the Courtroom, 20 JuDGES J. 18
(Winter 1981); Fatzer, Camerasin the Courtroom: The Kansas Opposition, 18 WASHBURN L.J. 230 (1979); Gerbner, Trial By Television. Are We At the Point of No Return?, 63 JUDICATURE 416 (1980); Power, Television in the Courtroom: Von Bulow
and "The Jazz Singer",25 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 813 (1982); Tongue & Lintott, The Case
Against Television in the Courtroom, 16 WILLAME'rE L. REV. 777 (1980).
For a spirited debate between two practicing attorneys, see Allied Educational
Foundation, Television in the Courtroom-LimitedBenefits, Vital Risks?, 3 COMM. &
L. 35 (Winter 1981) (educational conference).
16. See infra notes 193-228 and accompanying text.
17. The effects of pre-trial and trial publicity of events occurring outside the
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ample, in 1917, the use of still photography to record judicial
proceedings was a contributing factor in the reversal of a defendant's conspiracy conviction by the Illinois Supreme
Court.'" Ten years later, a news reporter in New York was
cited for contempt of court for violating a judicial order which
prohibited the taking of photographs in the courtroom during a
trial. 9
The controversy over press access to judicial proceedings increased when news photography blossomed with the growth of
tabloid newspapers after World War I. By the mid-1920s, courtroom photographs had become a regular feature of such major
papers as the New York Daily News.Y' The development of radio broadcasting added another dimension to press coverage of
judicial proceedings. For example, the great notoriety the
Scopes "Monkey Trial" 21 in 1925 received was due in part to the
radio broadcasting of the trial.22
In the wake of the abuse by the media-still and newsreel
photographers-during the sensational 1935 trial of Bruno
Hauptmann, 3 the American Bar Association adopted Canon 35
courtroom are beyond the scope of this Note. See, e.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S.
333 (1966); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
18. People v. Munday, 280 Ill. 32, 67, 117 N.E. 286, 300 (1917). In reference to still
photography in the courtroom, the court stated, "It is not in keeping with the dignity a
court should maintain, or with the proper and orderly conduct of its business, to permit its sessions to be interrupted and suspended for such a purpose." Id.
19. Ex parte Sturm, 152 Md. 114, 136 A. 312 (Ct. App. 1927). See also In re Seed,
140 Misc. Rep. 681, 684, 251 N.Y.S. 615, 618 (Sup. Ct. 1931) (photographer cited for
contempt for taking photographs in courthouse corridors in violation of a judicial order).
For a discussion of the diversity of early judicial approaches toward still photography of judicial proceedings, see Kielbowicz, The Story Behind the Adoption of the Ban
on Courtroom Cameras,63 JUDICATURE 14, 16-17 (1979). Despite various rules prohibiting access, "[u]ntil the early 1930's, still photography and even radio broadcasting of
court proceedings were fairly common in our courts." Tate, Cameras in the Courtroom. Here to Stay, 10 U. TOL. L. REv. 925, 925 (1979).
20. Kielbowicz, supra note 19, at 15.
21. John T. Scopes was convicted of teaching the Darwinian theory of evolution to
public school children in Dayton, Tennessee in violation of a state statute. M.
KRONENWETTER, FREE PREss V. FAIR TRIAL 28 (1986). The trial featured the preeminent attorneys of the day-William Jennings Bryan (prosecution) and Clarence Darrow (defense). Id.
22. The radio coverage caused no problems at trial and enabled a nationwide audience to participate in a great national debate. Id. at 34.
23. Hauptmann was convicted of the murder of Charles Lindbergh's infant child.
State v. Hauptmann, 115 N.J.L. 412, 180 A. 809, cert denied, 296 U.S. 649 (1935). For
recent discussions of the Hauptmann trial, see Portman, The Defense of Fair Trial
from Sheppard to Nebraska PressAssociation: Benign Neglect to Affirmative Action
and Beyond, 29 STAN. L. REV. 393, 396-97 (1977); Seidman, The Trial and Execution of
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of the Canons of Judicial Ethics.2 4 The Canon barred photography and broadcasting from judicial proceedings. A similar ban
was enacted for criminal proceedings in federal courts in 1946.1
B. Television Cameras in the Courtroom: The Initial Debate
In response to the emergence of the new medium of television, Canon 35 was amended in 1952 to include a ban on the
televising of court proceedings.26 The Canon was quickly
adopted by all of the states2' except Colorado,2 Oklahoma
Bruno Richard Hauptmann: Still Another Case That "Will Not Die," 66 GEO. L.J. 1
(1977).
24. Canon 35, as adopted in September, 1937, provided:
Proceedings in court should be conducted with fitting dignity and decorum.
The taking of photographs in the court room, during sessions of the court or
recesses between sessions, and the broadcasting of court proceedings are calculated to detract from the essential dignity of the proceedings, degrade the
court and create misconceptions with respect thereto in the mind of the public and should not be permitted.
62 A.B.A. REP. 1134-35 (1937). The Canon and its successor in the Code of Judicial
Conduct for United States Courts, Canon 3 A(7), infra note 26, is advisory in nature
and has no binding effect until adopted as a rule of court. E.g., Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S.
532, 535 (1965).
25. Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides, "The taking of
photographs in the courtroom during the progress of judicial proceedings or radio
broadcasting of judicial proceedings from the courtroom shall not be permitted by the
court." FED. R. CRIM. P. 53. There is no parallel federal rule prohibiting electronic
access to civil trials.
26. For discussion of Canon 35, pro and con, see Blashfleld, The Case of the Controversial Canon, 48 A.B.A.J. 429 (1962); Griswold, The Standards of the Legal Profession: Canon 35 Should Not be Surrendered,48 A.B.A.J. 615 (1962); Warden, Canon 35:
Is There Room for Objectivity?, 4 WASHBURN L.J. 211 (1965); Wilkin, JudicialCanon
35 Should Not Be Changed, 48 A.B.A.J. 540 (1962); Note, Canon 35: Cameras, Courts
and Conffusion, 51 KY. L.J. 737 (1963). In 1972, the ABA House of Delegates adopted
the Code of Judicial Conduct for United States Courts, a revision and renumbering of
the original Canons of Judicial Ethics. Canon 35 was embodied in Canon 3 A(7) of the
Code. It provided, in pertinent part, "A judge should prohibit broadcasting, televising,
recording or photography in courtrooms and areas immediately adjacent thereto during sessions of court or recesses between sessions .... " CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
FOR UNITED STATES COURTS Canon 3 A(7) (1972). For a discussion of Canon 3 A(7),
see E. THODE, REPORTER'S NOTES TO CODE OF JUDICIAL CQNDUCT 56-59 (1973). For a
discussion of the Canon as it currently reads, see infra n-ote 325.
27. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 580-81 & n.39 (1965). For a summary of current
state positions regarding the televising of trials, see infa notes 318-44 and accompanying text.
28. In re Hearings Concerning Canon 35, 132 Colo. 591, 296 P.2d 465 (Sup. Ct.
1956). The Colorado Supreme Court adopted a different version of the rule, giving the
trial judge discretion to exclude coverage depending upon whether it would "detract
from the dignity [of courtroom proceedings], distract the witness in giving his testimony, degrade the court, or otherwise materially interfere with the achievement of a
fair trial .... " Id. at 604, 296 P.2d at 472.
29. See, e.g., Lyles v. State, 330 P.2d 734 (Crim. App. Okla. 1958) (trial court did
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and Texas.30
Television coverage of a trial was first challenged by a criminal defendant in People v. Stroble,31 a 1951 California murder
case. The California Supreme Court upheld Stroble's conviction, finding the broadcast coverage improper but not reversible error in the absence of proof of jury prejudice.3 2
The first televised trial took place in 1953 in Oklahoma
City. 3 During the trial, the presiding judge had the power to
instantly discontinue the filming by pushing a button installed
at the bench.34 The first live television broadcast of courtroom
proceedings involved the 1955 murder trial of Harry L. Washburn in Waco, Texas.' Coverage of the trial was approved by
the defendant and lauded by the media and county bar
association.'
C. From Estes to Chandler: A Due Process Analysis
The televised trial of Billy Sol Estes in 19621 provided the
United States Supreme Court with the opportunity to determine the constitutionality of television coverage of a criminal
trial over the defendant's objection?8' Estes, a wealthy and politically well-connected financier, was convicted of swindling
farmers by selling them non-existent farm equipment. Television and newsreel (film) coverage was highly disruptive during
not abuse its discretion in permitting television cameras and the taking of photographs in the courtroom). See also Estes, 381 U.S. at 580-81 n.38 (Warren, C.J., concurring) (electronic access in Oklahoma is within discretion of the trial judge) (citing
Cody v. State, 381 P.2d 307 (Crim. App. Okla. 1961)).
30. Estes, 381 U.S. at 580-81 n.38. (Warren, C.J., concurring).
31. 36 Cal. 2d 615, 226 P.2d 330 (1951), offd, 343 U.S. 181 (1952). Stroble, convicted
of first degree murder for the brutal slaying of a young child, contended that newspaper accounts of his arrest and confession were so inflammatory as to make a fair trial
impossible. Id at 620-21.
32. Id at 621, 226 P.2d at 334. The United States Supreme Court affirmed the
California Supreme Court's finding that the defendant failed to prove that jury prejudice resulted from the extensive media coverage. 343 U.S. at 191-95.
33. Geis, A Lively Public Issue: Canon 35 in the Light of Recent Events, 43
A.B.A.J. 419, 420 (1957) (case citation not provided).
34. I&
35. Id
36. The majority of calls received by local television stations voiced approval of
the coverage, though a few complained that their favorite program had been preempted. Id at 421. When defendant Washburn was asked whether he was bothered
by the televising of his trial, he replied, "Naw, let it go all over the world. I don't
care." I& at 420.
37. See Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
38. M. KRONENWETER, supra note 21, at 49.

1987]

CAMERAS IN THE COURTROOM

pre-trial hearings.s The disruption was largely eliminated during the trial as a result of press compliance with a series of
restrictive orders issued by the presiding judge. 40 Nevertheless,
a sharply divided Supreme Court 4 ' reversed the conviction,
holding that the television coverage over Estes' objection
constituted a denial of due process under the fourteenth
amendment.4

Both Justice Clark, writing for the Court, and Chief Justice
Warren, in his concurring opinion, found the televising of the
trial over Estes' objection a per se violation of his due process
rights.4 3 These opinions, together with Justice Harlan's concurrence, state that the inherent probability of prejudice resulting
from television coverage was sufficient to render unnecessary
an actual showing of the harmful effects of such coverage."
39. Justice Clark described the circus-like atmosphere created by coverage of the
pre-trial hearings:
The videotapes of these hearings clearly illustrate that the picture presented
was not one of that judicial serenity and calm to which petitioner was entiIndeed, at least 12 cameramen were engaged in the courtroom
tled ....
throughout the hearing taking motion and still pictures and televising the
proceedings. Cables and wires were snaked across the courtroom floor, three
microphones were on the judge's bench and others were beamed at the jury
box and the counsel table.
381 U.S. at 536 (citations omitted). One commentator has stated that the cameramen
behaved so poorly that "it was as if their main purpose was to convince the judiciary
never to allow them into a courtroom again." M. KRONENWETrER, supra note 21, at
49-50.
40. For example, pursuant to the trial judge's orders, a booth was constructed at
the back of the courtroom to house the cameras and photographers. See 381 U.S. at
537; il. at 606-09 (Stewart, J., dissenting). See also il..at 586 app. (Warren, C.J., concurring) (photographs of courtroom during pre-trail hearings and trial).
41. The opinion of the Court was delivered by Justice Clark. Chief Justice Warren delivered a concurring opinion which was joined by Justices Douglas and
Goldberg. Id at 552. Justice Harlan wrote a second concurring opinion which was the
majority's crucial fifth vote. Id. at 587. Justice Stewart issued a dissenting opinion,
joined by Justices Black, Brennan and White. I at 601. Justices White and Brennan
each wrote separate dissenting opinions. Id. at 615, 617.
42. 381 U.S. at 534-35.
43. Id. at 535, 538, 550; it at 552 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
44. Id. at 542-44; id. at 578 (Warren, C.J., concurring); id. at 593 (Harlan, J., concurring). In rejecting a requirement that a defendant demonstrate actual prejudice,
see People v. Stroble, 36 Cal. 2d 615, 621, 226 P.2d 330, 334 (1951), discussed supra notes
31-32, the Estes Court followed more recent cases involving circumstances which were
found to be "inherently prejudicial." 381 U.S. at 543-44 (citing Turner v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. 466 (1965); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963); White v. Maryland, 373
U.S. 59 (1963); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); In re Murchison, 349 U.S.
133, 136 (1955) ("our system of law has always endeavored to prevent even the
probability of unfairness") (emphasis in original)).
An additional rationale was the expressed difficulty in making a showing of actual
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A lingering source of controversy is the extent to which Justice Harlan's swing vote limited the absolutist position adopted
by Justice Clark and the Chief Justice.45 Justice Harlan's opinion has been variously interpreted as: 1) erecting a per se ban
on television coverage of trial proceedings in accord with the
opinions of Clark and Warren; 46 2) limiting the application of
the Court's prohibition to notorious trials;47 and 3) limiting the
application of the Court's prohibition to the facts of the Estes
case.48 The narrower views are supported by Justice Harlan's
prejudice, 381 U.S. at 544, which "may be so subtle that it escapes the ordinary methods of proof, but it would gradually erode our fundamental conception of a trial." Id.
at 578 (Warren, C.J., concurring). Accord Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 577
(1981). See also infra notes 237-39 and accompanying text.
45. See, e.g., Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 570-74 (1981); Marcus, The Media
in the Courtroom:Attending, Reporting, Televising Criminal Cases, 57 IND. L.J. 235,
280-81 (1982). For further discussion of Estes, see Comment, The Televised Tria" A
Perspective, 7 CUM.-SAM. L. REV. 323 (1976); Note, ConstitutionalLaw-Televising
CriminalTrials of WidespreadPublicInterestInherently DeprivesDefendant ofDue
Process of Law, 34 FORDHAM L. REV. 329 (1965) [hereinafter Televising Criminal Trials]; Note, ConstitutionalLaw-Televised Trial Violates Defendant's Rights Under
FourteenthAmendment, 37 MIss. L.J. 168 (1965); Note, Television in the Courtroom:
Estes v. Texas, 6 SANTA CLARA LAW REV. 109 (1965) [hereinafter Television in the
Courtroom]; Note, Estes v. Texas, 38 U. COLO. L. REV. 276 (1966); Note, Televising a
Notorious State Criminal Trial Violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 27 U. PITT. L. REV. 141 (1965) [hereinafter Telecasting]; Note, Constitutional Law-Televising of Criminal TrialsHeld Violative of the Right to a FairTrial,
18 VAND. L. REV. 2049 (1965); Note, ConstitutionalLaw-FairTrial-TelevisingAs
Affecting Defendants' Rights Under Due Process Clause, 30 ALB. L. REV. 158 (1966).
46. E.g., Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560,583 (1981) (Stewart, J., concurring) (cit-

ing Estes, 381 U.S. at 614 (Stewart, J., dissenting)); id. at 615 (White, J., dissenting).
See also Chandler,449 U.S. at 587 (White, J., concurring) (citing Estes, 381 U.S. at 587
(Harlan, J., concurring)); Bradley v. Texas, 470 F.2d 785, 787 (5th Cir. 1972), reh'g
denied, 470 F.2d 785 (1973) ("television coverage of a trial is considered inherently
prejudicial"); Televising Criminal Trials, supra note 45, at 333; Television in the
Courtroom, supra note 45, at 110. Contra Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 573-74
(1981); Estes, 381 U.S. at 617 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
47. See, e.g., Zaehringer v. Brewer, 635 F.2d 734, 738 (8th Cir. 1980); Telecasting,
supra note 45, at 144. Cf Marcus, supra note 45, at 281 n.266 ("[e]normous problems
would be created, however, if trial judges actually had to determine which cases were
sufficiently 'notorious' "). Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Estes stated:
[Aft least as to a notoriouscriminal trialsuch as this one, the considerations
against allowing television in the courtroom so far outweigh the countervailing factors advanced in its support as to require a holding that what was
done in this case infringed the fundamental right to a fair trial assured by the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
381 U.S. at 587 (emphasis added).
48. This view has been widely adopted and has emerged as the Supreme Court's
position. See, e.g., Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 573 (1981); Nebraska Press Ass'n
v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 552 (1976); Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 799 (1975); accord
Hale v. United States, 435 F.2d 737, 746-47 (5th Cir. 1970), cert denied, 402 U.S. 976
(1971).
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statement: "At the present juncture I can only conclude that
televised trials, at least in cases like this one, possess such capabilities for interfering with the even course of the judicial pro'49
cess that they are constitutionally banned.

In their separate opinions, Justices Clark, Warren and
Harlan identified the potential problems created by the televising of trials: the psychological impact of television coverage on
trial participants; 50 other harmful effects on the trial judge,3 '
jurors, 52 criminal defendants,5 witnesses 54 and attorneys;" the
impact of electronic coverage on the integrity and decorum of
judicial proceedings;s and the effect of such coverage on the
general public.5 Additionally, Chief Justice Warren and Justice Harlan cited the widespread implementation of Canon 35
by the statess8 Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure59 and a 1962 resolution of the Judicial Conference of the
United Statese to support their view that cameras should be
49. 381 U.S. at 596 (Harlan, J., concurring) (emphasis added). Justice Harlan also
framed the issue in the case: "[W]e are concerned here only with a criminal trial of
great notoriety, and not with criminal proceedings of a more or less routine nature."
Id. at 587 (Harlan, J., concurring).
50. Id. at 544-50, 565; id. at 568-70 n.24 (Warren, C.J., concurring); id. at 591-93
(Harlan, J., concurring). See also infra notes 241-43 and accompanying text.
51. "Our judges are high-minded men and women. But it is difficult to remain
oblivious to the pressures that the news media can bring to bear on them both directly
and through the shaping of public opinion." 381 U.S. at 548; id at 565 (Warren, C.J.,
concurring). See also ifma notes 244-50 and accompanying text.
52. 381 U.S. at 545-47. See also infra notes 251-55 and accompanying text.
53. 381 U.S. at 549; id. at 565 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
54. Id. at 547-48. See also infra notes 256-66 and accompanying text.
55. I. at 591 (Harlan, J., concurring). See also infra notes 267-69 and accompanying text.
56. 381 U.S. at 560-64 (Warren, C.J., concurring); id. at 587 (Harlan, J., concurring); id. at 601 (Stewart, J., dissenting). See also infra notes 275-83 and accompanying text.
57. 381 U.S. at 574-76 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
58. Id. at 580-81 (Warren, C.J., concurring); id. at 594 (Harlan, J. concurring). See
supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
59. 381 U.S. at 581-82 n.40 (Warren, C.J., concurring); id. at 594 (Harlan, J., concurring). See supra note 25.
60. 381 U.S. at 582-83 n.41. The resolution provides:
Resolved, That the Judicial Conference of the United States condemns the
taking of photographs in the courtroom or its environs in connection with
any judicial proceedings, and the broadcasting of judicial proceedings by radio, television, or other means, and considers such practices to be inconsistent
with fair judicial procedure and that they ought not to be permitted in any
federal court.
Courtroom Photographs, ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 9,10 (1962-63). The Judicial Conference's recom-

mended ban remains intact despite a challenge in 1984. See infra note 128.
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excluded.
Although not directly at issue before the Court, the Estes majority explicitly rejected the claim of a right of access under the
first amendment."' Justice Clark asserted that "[wihile maximum freedom must be allowed the press in carrying on this
important function in a democratic society its exercise must
necessarily be subject to the maintenance of absolute fairness
in the judicial process."6 2 Chief Justice Warren concurred with
Clark's balancing approach:
[T]elevision is one of the great inventions of all time and can
perform a large and useful role in society. But the television
camera, like other technological innovations, is not entitled to
pervade the lives of everyone in disregard of constitutionally
protected rights.... On entering that hallowed sanctuary [an

American courtroom], where the lives, liberty and property of
people are in jeopardy, television representatives have only the
rights of the general public, namely, to be present, to observe
the proceedings, and thereafter, if they choose, to report
them. 6s
The majority and concurring opinions set out a balancing approach toward the conflict between first amendment and due
process rights. The opinions appear to conclude both that due
process rights should be accorded greater protection than first
amendment rights in this context and that the mere presumption of a due process violation provides a sufficient foundation
for the exclusion of television cameras.
The United States Supreme Court did not clarify or reevaluate Estes until 1981. In Chandler v. Florida," the Court re61. 381 U.S. at 539.
62. Id. In dissent, Justice Stewart expressed the view that first amendment considerations may be sufficient to invalidate an inflexible prohibition on electronic
access:
[I]t is important to remember that we move in an area touching the realm
of free communication, and for that reason, if for no other, I would be wary
of imposing any per se rule which, in the light of future technology, might
serve to stifle or abridge true First Amendment rights.
Id. at 604 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
63. Id. at 585-86 (Warren, C.J., concurring) (footnote omitted). Accord id at 589
(Harlan, J., concurring) ("the line is drawn at the courthouse door, and within, a reporter's constitutional rights are no greater than those of any other member of the
public").
64. 449 U.S. 560 (1981). The case involved the televising of the trial of two Miami
Beach police officers charged with the burglary of a restaurant. The coverage, over
the defendants' objections, was authorized by Florida's Canon 3 A(7) and limited to
voir dire, a portion of the state's case-in-chief, and the closing arguments of both sides.
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jected the Estes plurality's view that the televising of
courtroom proceedings was inherently prejudicial to a criminal
defendant.' The Court stated that electronic coverage is not
per se unconstitutional; instead, a showing of actual prejudice is
required to constitute a denial of due process.66 In finding that
Estes did not announce a per se ban, the Court construed Justice Harlan's concurring opinion narrowly--consistent with
Supreme Court decisions 6 -and limited the holding of Estes to
its facts, and those cases "utterly corrupted by press coverage.' ' se Accordingly, the Chandlermajority chose to distinguish
rather than overrule Estes.6 9
The issue in Chandler was a narrow one: whether a state
court rule allowing electronic access to criminal trials over the
defendant's objection comports with the requirements of due
process. 70 In support of its refusal to erect a categorical bar to
television coverage, the Court, per Chief Justice Burger, relied
on principles of federalism, stating:
Ultimately, the only material broadcast was two minutes and 55 seconds of the prosecution's case. Id. at 567-68.
65. 449 U.S. at 570-74. For a discussion of Chandler and its analysis of Estes, see
Ares, Chandler v. Florida: Television, CriminalTrials and Due Process,1981 Sup. CT.
REV. 157 (1982); Marcus, supra note 45, at 283-86; Pequinot, From Estes to Chandler:
Shifting the ConstitutionalBurden of Courtroom Cameras to the States, 9 FLA. ST.
U.L. REV. 315 (1981); Note, From Estes to Chandler: The Distinction Between Television and Newspaper Trial Coverage, 3 CoMm/ENT L.J. 503 (1981) [hereinafter Television and Newspaper Trial Coverage]; Note, In the Wake of Chandler v. Florida: A
Comprehensive Approach to the Implementation of Cameras in the Courtroom, 33
FED. CoMM. L.J. 117 (1981) [hereinafter A Comprehensive Approach).
66. 449 U.S. at 582; id. at 588 (White, J., concurring). No showing of actual prejudice was offered by the defendants or found by the Court. Id at 581-82.
The Court's rejection of a per se prohibition was due in part to the technological
advances in broadcast equipment since Estes, which enable coverage without disruption. Chandler,449 U.S. at 576. Justice Stewart, concurring in the result, cautioned
that despite technological advances, "[i]t does not follow, however, that the 'subtle
capacities for serious mischief' are today diminished, or that the 'imponderables of the
trial arena' are now less elusive." Id. at 585 (Stewart, J., concurring in result).
67. See supra note 48.
68. 449 U.S. at 573 n.8 (quoting Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 798 (1975)).
69. 449 U.S. at 573 n.8. The Court stated: "As noted ... Justice Harlan pointedly
limited his conclusion to cases like the one then before the Court;" thus there was "no
need to 'overrule' a 'holding' never made by the Court." Id. Justices Stewart and
White, in their separate concurring opinions, did not accept the narrow interpretation
of Estes. They concluded instead that, despite the limiting language of Justice
Harlan's concurring opinion, Estes announced a per se ban on the televising of courtroom proceedings. Therefore, Estes would have to be effectively overruled in order to
affirm the conviction in Chandler. 449 U.S. at 583 (Stewart, J., concurring in result);
id at 587-88 (White, J., concurring in judgment).
70. 449 U.S. 562, 582-83.
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[U]nless we were to conclude that television coverage under all
circumstances is prohibited by the Constitution, the states
must be free to experiment. We are not empowered by the
Constitution to oversee or harness state procedural experimentation; only when the state action infringes fundamental guarantees are we authorized to intervene. 71
Moreover, the Court found that the potential dangers created
by the broadcasting of trials had not been proven with sufficient certainty to justify an absolute ban.7 2 The Court also
found it significant that more than half the states then allowed
television coverage to some degree,73 in contrast to the widespread prohibition of electronic access at the time Estes was decided.7 4 An additional basis for the Candler decision was the
Court's deference to the breadth and judicial supervision of
Florida's experimental program which preceded the state's allowance of electronic access on a permanent basis.73
D.

First Amendment Rights of Press and Public Access
to the Courtroom

Less than one year prior to the Chandler decision, the
Supreme Court thoroughly explored the interrelationship between the first amendment and the constitutional rights of a
criminal defendant. The issue before the Court in Richmond
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia76 was whether the exclusion of
the press and public from the courtroom during a trial was constitutional. In invalidating the trial judge's closure orders,
seven justices 77 recognized that the first amendment-of itself
71. Id. at 582.
72. 449 U.S. at 578-79.
73. Id. at 565 n.6. The Court noted that as of October 1980, 28 states permitted
electronic coverage of judicial proceedings. In addition, the possibility of allowing access was being studied by 12 other states. Id. The Court also noted the changing attitude of state judicial systems in favor of allowing television coverage of trials. Id. at
564. The Court cited the Conference of State Chief Justices' passage of a resolution in
1978, by a vote of 44 to 1 (with one abstaining), "to allow the highest court of each
state to promulgate standards and guidelines regulating radio, television and other
photographic coverage of courtroom proceedings." Id. (citing Resolution I, Television, Radio, Photographic Coverage of Judicial Proceedings, adopted at the Thirtieth
Annual Meeting of the Conference of Chief Justices, Burlington, Vt., Aug. 2, 1978).
74. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
75. 449 U.S. at 564-66; Kamisar, Chandler v. Florida: What Can Be Said for a
"Right of Access to Televise JudicialProceedings?",3 Sup. CT.: TRENDS & DEvs. 149,
154 (1982).
76. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
77. Chief Justice Burger wrote the plurality opinion, joined by Justices White and
Stevens. Justice Brennan wrote a concurring opinion, joined by Justice Marshall. Id.
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and as applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment-protects the right
of both the press and the public to
78
attend criminal trials.
In his plurality opinion, Chief Justice Burger stressed the importance of public confidence in the judiciary which, he asserted, is furthered by the publicizing of trial proceedings.79
The Chief Justice also advanced the theory that press coverage
performs therapeutic and cathartic functions for the public.80
Essentially, the plurality opinion was anchored on two premises: 1) the history and presumption of public access to American courtrooms" and 2) the assumption that publicity serves
"to enhance the integrity and quality of what takes place [in
the courtroom]. 8 2 Similarly, Justice Brennan, concurring, emphasized "the beneficial effects of public scrutiny upon the administration of justice. ' 3
In addition to prohibiting the closure of criminal trials to the
public and press generally, Richmond Newspapers articulated
the principle that, although first amendment rights of access
are not absolute,84 their abridgment cannot be arbitrary." The
at 584. Justices Stewart, White, Stevens and Blackmun each issued separate concurring opinions. Id. at 581, 582, 598, 601. Justice Rehnquist dissented and Justice Powell
took no part in the case. Id. at 581. The decision has been criticized for the Court's
failure to agree on the rationale for its holding. See, e.g., BeVier, Like Mackerel in the
Moonlight: Some Reflections on Richmond Newspapers, 10 HOFSTRA L. REv. 311
(1982); Switzer, Applying Criticismsof the Warren Court to the Burger Court"A Case
Study of Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 5 U. ARK. LITLE ROCK L.J. 203
(1982).
78. 448 U.S. at 575-80 (plurality opinion); id. at 581-82 (White, J., concurring); id.
at 582-84 (Stevens, J., concurring); id at 598 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 599
(Stewart, J., concurring); id at 604 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
79. Id. at 570 (plurality opinion). Accord id. at 593-94 (Brennan, J., concurring)
("[flor a civilization founded upon principles of ordered liberty to survive and flourish,
its members must share the conviction that they are governed equitably"); id, at 596
(Brennan, J., concurring) ("without publicity, all other checks are insufficient: in
comparison of publicity, all other checks are of small account").
80. Id at 570-71 (plurality opinion) ("no community catharsis can occur if justice
'is done in a corner [or] in any covert manner' ").
81. Id. at 564-69.
82. Id. at 578.
83. Id. at 592-93 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting Cox Broadcasting Corp. v.
Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 492 (1975)).
84. 448 U.S. at 581 n.18; id. at 598 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 600 (Stewart, J.,
concurring). In these references the Court notes that reasonable restrictions on access, akin to time, place, or manner restrictions, are permissible. See infra notes 22128 and accompanying text.
85. 448 U.S. at 580-81; id. at 583 (Stevens, J., concurring); id at 600-01 (Brennan,
J., concurring).
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Court found dispositive both the trial judge's failure to make
any specific findings to support his closure order and his failure
to employ safeguards less restrictive than closure to assure the
defendant a fair trial."'
In Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 7 the Court reaffirmed and clarified its holding in Richmond Newspapers that a
trial judge must make specific findings to justify closure of a
criminal trial."' The Court invalidated a Massachusetts statute
which required closure of all rape or sexual assault trials during the testimony of minors. The Court held that a state's denial of access in order to inhibit the disclosure of sensitive
information is subject to strict scrutiny and, therefore, valid
only if the denial is "necessitated by a compelling governmental interest, and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest."' 9
The Court recognized the state's substantial interest in protect-:
ing the well-being of minor victims of sexual assault, but read
Richmond Newspapers to proscribe any mandatory closure
rules. Instead, a case-by-case evaluation of whether closure is
necessary to protect the threatened interest is required.90
86. E.g., Chandler,449 U.S. at 580-81. Chief Justice Burger indicated that the trial
judge should have either excluded witnesses from the courtroom or sequestered them
during the trial. Id.at 581. The Court referred to other safeguards for ensuring a fair
trial in light of dangers posed by the press in covering trials discussed in Nebraska
Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 56365 (1976), and Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S.
333, 357-62 (1964). 448 U.S. at 581.
87. 457 U.S. 596 (1982). Unlike Richmond Newspapers, the Court in Globe issued
a majority opinion, joined by five justices. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Stevens,
among the majority in Richmond Newspapers, dissented. Id. at 612, 620.
88. The Court synthesized the various opinions in Richmond Newspapers as emphasizing two features of the criminal justice system that justify a first amendment
right of access: the historical openness of criminal trials, 457 U.S. at 607, and the role
of access in the judicial process, id.at 606. Within the latter rationale, the Court noted
that public scrutiny can enhance the factfinding function of trials, id., and that openness heightens public respect for the judicial process by fostering an appearance of
fairness, id
89. Id. at 607. In a footnote, the Court stressed the narrow scope of its holding,
but restated that "a mandatory rule, requiring no particularized determinations in
individual cases, is unconstitutional." Id. at 611 n.27.
90. Id.at 608. "Indeed, the plurality opinion in Richmond Newspapers suggested
that individualized determinations are always required before the right of access may
be denied." Id at 608 n.20 (citing Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 581). The Court
has since extended the press' riglit of access under Richmond Newspapers and Globe
to voir dire proceedings, Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Ct. 464 U.S. 501 (1984), and
certain pre-trial hearings, Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Ct., 106 S.Ct. 2735 (1986).
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III
The Exclusion of Cameras from

the Federal Courts
As stated, Chandler v. Florida answered the question of
whether electronic access could, consistent with due process, be
permitted over a criminal defendant's objection." The converse-whether such access can, consistent with the first
amendment, be absolutely denied-has been considered by federal courts of appeals in three significant cases, all of which involved charges of misconduct by prominent government
officialsY2
A.

United States v. Hastings
In United States v. Hastings,93 the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals considered the constitutional validity of Federal Rule
of Criminal Procedure 53" and a local rule of court 5 prohibiting electronic access to federal courtrooms in the Southern District of Florida. The Hastings trial involved criminal charges
that United States District Court Judge Alcee Hastings ac91. See supra notes 64-75 and accompanying text.
92. United States v. Edwards, 785 F.2d 1293 (5th Cir. 1986); Westmoreland v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 752 F.2d 16 (2d Cir. 1984); United States v. Hastings,
695 F.2d 1278 (11th Cir. 1983). In a fourth case, request was made by the defendant-on trial for allegedly failing to register for the draft-to photograph, record and
broadcast his trial. United States v. Kerley, 753 F.2d 617 (7th Cir. 1985). As the
court's opinion relies heavily on the reasoning of Hastings, discussed infra notes 93104 and accompanying text, extensive discussion of the case is unnecessary.
93. 695 F.2d 1278, reh'g en banc denied per curiam,704 F.2d 559 (11th Cir.), cert
denied, 459 U.S. 1203 (1983).
94. See supra note 25.
95. Local Rule 20 of the General Rules of the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida prohibits "all forms of equipment or means of
photographing, tape-recording, broadcasting or televising within the environs of any
place of holding court in the District." See Hastings, 695 F.2d at 1279 n.4. For other
cases considering the constitutionality of local rules restricting press access to federal
courts, see Combined Communications Corp. v. Finesilver, 672 F.2d 818 (10th Cir.
1982) (upholding rule excluding the press from negotiations undertaken in a federal
courtroom); Mazzetti v. United States, 518 F.2d 781 (10th Cir. 1975) (upholding rule
prohibiting the taking of photographs from a courthouse parking lot); Dorfman v.
Meiszner, 430 F.2d 558 (7th Cir. 1970) (rule prohibiting photographing and broadcasting inside courtrooms and various floors of federal building held unconstitutionally
overbroad where areas included in the ban did not involve judicial administration);
Seymour v. United States, 373 F.2d 629 (5th Cir. 1967) (upholding prohibition on the
taking of photographs from the hallway outside a courtroom); United States v. Yonkers, 587 F. Supp. 51 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (newspaper reporter prohibited from using tape
recorder in court under General Rule 7, the same local rule at issue in
Westmoreland).
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cepted a bribe from an undercover agent posing as a criminal
defendant. 6 The court upheld the two rules using a two-step
analysis. It first noted that the Richmond Newspapers and
Globe decisions do not support the proposition that the first
amendment mandates electronic access. r In this part of its
analysis, the court gave controlling weight to Nixon v. Warner
Communications, Inc." The Supreme Court there held that
the press had no first amendment right of access to the Watergate tapes, which had been admitted into evidence in the trial
of President Nixon's former advisors.9 The Hastings court determined that the issue of televised trial coverage was more
akin to the first amendment claim rejected in Warner Communications than the access right recognized in Globe and Richmond Newspapers.00
96. 695 F.2d at 1279 n.6. Judge Hastings moved the trial court to allow electronic
coverage of the trial. Subsequently, local news organizations intervened in support of
the motion. Id at 1279-80.
97. Id.at 1280. The court correctly found that none of the holdings of these cases
recognized a constitutional right to televised trials. However, the court's statement
that "[n]one of those decisions intimate that the Supreme Court would find First
Amendment rights abridged by the exclusion of television cameras... from the courtroom," id at 1280 (emphasis added), ignores the import of the cases when read
together.
98. 435 U.S. 589 (1978).
99. Id at 609. Primarily, the Hastings court cited Warner Communications for
the maxim that the press' right to gather information about trials is no greater than
that of the general public. 695 F.2d at 1281 (citing Warner Communications, 435 U.S.
at 609). This language was based in part on Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in
Estes, 381 U.S. at 589 ("[t]he 'public trial' guarantee... certainly does not require that
television be admitted to the courtroom"). The Hastings court's reliance on this aspect of Warner Communications is erroneous in light of Chandler'slimitation of Estes subsequent to the Warner Communications decision. See ikfra notes 178-83 and
accompanying text.
100. 695 F.2d at 1281. This finding is dubious. The right of access to the courtroom
by electronic means more closely resembles the right to access by non-electronic
means-recognized in Richmond Newspapers and Globe-than the right to take physical possession of trial evidence, rejected in Warner Communications. Thus, the Hastings court's reliance on Warner Communications is misplaced.
The court does distinguish on two grounds Warner Communicationsand a similar
case from the Fifth Circuit, Belo Broadcasting Corp. v. Clark, 654 F.2d 423 (5th Cir.
1981), from the claim at issue in Hastings,finding neither ground sufficient to render
those cases inapposite. The distinctions are: 1) that the local rule in Hastings was a
per se prohibition, in conflict with the requirement set forth in Warner Communications and Belo Broadcastingthat the trial judge make case-by-case determinations as
to media access, and 2) that unlike the defendants in Warner Communications and
Belo Broadcasting,defendant Hastings did not oppose the requested form of access.
695 F.2d at 1281. In dismissing the first distinction, the Hastings court stated that the
complete restriction on access in Globe was not a factor in Hastings as the press and
public were not barred from the courtroom entirely during the trial. Id.As for con-
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Second, the Hastings court did look to Globe and Richmond
Newspapers for the proper standard of review for evaluating
the per se exclusion of cameras. After concluding that exclusion was not subject to strict scrutiny under Globe 101 because
1°
the exclusionary rules only restricted the manner of access, 2
the court read Globe and Richmond Newspapers to permit analysis of the rules as "time, place or manner" regulations.103 The
court upheld the rules by determining that the competing policy considerations justified exclusion. 1°4
B.

Westmoreland v. Columbia BroadcastingSystem, Inc.

In Westmoreland v. Columbia BroadcastingSystem, Inc.,105
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals agreed that a per se rule
excluding electronic access does not violate the first amendment. Cable News Network (CNN) petitioned the district
court for permission to broadcast the Westmoreland libel
trial1l 6 CNN asked the court for a waiver of General Rule 7,107
sent, the court noted that it was but one factor to consider, and did not outweigh more
important policy considerations. Id. at 1282-83.
101. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
102. 695 F.2d at 1282-83. The court's reasoning is inconsistent. First it stated that
Warner Communications is more relevant than Globe and Richmond Newspapers.
Id. at 1281. Then the court analyzed the prohibitory rules under dicta from Globe,
concluding that Warner Communications was controlling authority. Id. at 1284. For
criticism of the majority's analysis, see United States v. Hastings, 704 F.2d 559, 560-62
(11th Cir. 1983) (Hatchett, J., statement in favor of rehearing en banc); Julin, The
Inevitability of ElectronicMedia Access to Federal Courts, 1983 DET. C. L REv. 1303,
1303-04.
103. 695 F.2d at 1282-84. Under the time, place or manner doctrine, expressive activity which is otherwise protected under the first amendment may be regulated as to
the time, place or manner of its exercise. See infra notes 196-228 and accompanying
text.
104. 695 F.2d at 1282-84. The court pinpointed two primary concerns-the interest
in preserving order and decorum in the courtroom and the "institutional interest in
procedures designed to increase the accuracy of the essential truth-seeking function
of the trial." Id. at 1283. The court found those interests more compelling than the
potential for advancement of first amendment interests recognized in Globe, Richmond Newspapers, and Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 382 (1979) (upholding
exclusion of the press from a pre-trial suppression hearing). In light of Estes' built-in
obsolescence, see Estes, 381 U.S. at 595-96 (Harlan, J., concurring), and Warner Communications' lack of relevance, supra note 100 and infra notes 178-83 and accompanying text, the balance struck by the court is tenuous. Judge Hatchett, dissenting
from the Eleventh Circuit's decision not to hear the case en banc, concluded that the
relevant policy considerations weighed in favor of electronic access. United States v.
Hastings, 704 F.2d at 560-62 (Hatchett, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en
banc).
105. 752 F.2d 16 (2d Cir. 1984).
106. The subject of the libel suit was The UncountedEnemy: A Vietnam Deception
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which prohibits the use of television cameras in the district
courts for the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York.
Similar to the claim of access asserted in Hastings, CNN alleged that Rule 7's per se prohibition violated the free press
clause of the first amendment. 108 CNN also argued that waiver
of the rule was proper because the issues involved were of great
public importancec 9 and all parties to the litigation consented
to the proposed coverage. 10
In his opinion and order, United States District Judge Leval
denied the petition, citing his lack of authority to set aside the
inflexible prohibition of Rule 7."' However, Leval expressed
his view that such coverage should be allowed, citing the Chandler decision,"12 the large number of states allowing coverage,"13
and various policy considerations." 4 He suggested that a per se
prohibition of broadcast coverage of trials was in conflict with
(CBS news broadcast Jan. 23, 1982). The program asserted that General Westmoreland participated in a conspiracy to deceive the President, Congress and the American
public by intentionally underreporting enemy troop strength in Vietnam just prior to
the Tet Offensive. The parties to the suit stipulated to a dismissal on February 18,
1985 and issued a mutually conciliatory joint statement. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 19,1985,
at B-6, col. 2. For thorough discussions of the case, see R. ADLER, RECKLESS DISREGARD (1986); D. KowET, A MATTER OF HONOR (1984); P. ROTH, THE JUROR AND THE
GENERAL (1986) (juror's account of the trial).
107. See supra note 6.
108. 752 F.2d at 17.
109. Id.
110. Id. The court of appeals went so far as to assume arguendo that Westmoreland presented a paradigm case for televising a federal trial. Id.
111. Westmoreland v. CBS, Inc., 596 F. Supp 1166, 1170 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
112. Id. at 1168 (citing Chandler, 449 U.S. 560).
113. 596 F. Supp. at 1168. When CNN petitioned to broadcast the Westmoreland
trial in August of 1984, 41 states allowed cameras in their courtrooms on permanent
or experimental bases. Id. For a current summary of electronic access to state courtrooms, see infra notes 326-44 and accompanying text. See also Note, An Assessment Qf
the Use of Camerasin State and FederalCourtrooms, 18 GA. L. REv. 389, 402-12 (1984)
[hereinafter Cameras in State and Federal Courtrooms]; Annotation, Validity, Propriety, and Effect of Allowing or ProhibitingMedia's Broadcasting, Recording, or
PhotographingCourt Proceedings,14 A.L.R. 4th 121 (1982).
Eighty-one of ninety-two U.S. district courts have rules prohibiting electronic access. Those federal courts permitting access include district courts in Alaska, Indiana
(N.D.), Tennessee (E.D. & W.D.), Texas (E.D. & W.D.) and Vermont. FEDERAL LoCAL COURT RULES, (Callaghan) (1986). See also infra note 128 and accompanying
text.
114. Judge Leval stated that in a case involving strong public interest, electronic
coverage could ensure that witnesses tell the truth and that the court does not improperly influence the jury. 596 F. Supp. at 1168. In addition, Judge Leval pointed
out the importance of public opportunity to learn how the courts function; personal
time constraints and the length of many trials are such that television coverage could
serve as the only opportunity for many to view judicial proceedings. Id. at 1169. Fi-
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the spirit of Chandler as well as subsequent Supreme Court
cases,1 1 5 and restated the many benefits offered by trial publicity mentioned in those decisions.' 16
At issue on appeal to the Second Circuit was CNN's claim
that the Rule 7 prohibition of electronic access abridged first
amendment rights and therefore was in violation of the Rules
Enabling Act. 117 In refusing to recognize a first amendment
right of access to broadcast courtroom proceedings, the court,
per Judge Oakes, relied on the Supreme Court's prior failure to
do so in Estes and Chandler. The court declined to undertake a
modern constitutional analysis, and relegated the "carefully
reasoned" arguments of Judge Leval to a footnote."'
The court analyzed the asserted first amendment claim to
broadcast trials by dividing it into two discrete rights: 1) the
press' right to broadcast trials; and 2) the public's right to view
televised judicial proceedings. 119 The court based its rejection
of the press' first amendment right to broadcast trials on Estes 120 and, in particular, on Justice Harlan's statement in Estes
that "there is no constitutional requirement that television be
nally, Judge Leval noted that electronic coverage is necessary to increase public confidence and respect for federal judges. Id.
115. 596 F. Supp. at 1168 (citing, inter aliai Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Ct.,
464 U.S. 501 (1984); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Ct., 457 U.S. 596 (1982)).
116. 596 F. Supp. at 1168-69. See supra notes 79-83.
117. The Rules Enabling Act states in pertinent part:
The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe by general rules, the
forms of process, writs, pleadings and motions, and the practice and procedure of the district courts and courts of appeals of the United States in civil
actions .... Such rules shall not abridge,enlarge or modify any substantive
right....
28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982) (emphasis added).
CNN also asserted that first amendment rights were implicated by virtue of the
trial being a "public forum." This argument was dismissed by the court, which viewed
such a right as exclusively a "speaker's interest," separate from the access right asserted by the media. 752 F.2d at 21-22.
118. 752 F.2d at 18 & n.3.
119. Id. at 21.
120. Id.The court's reliance on Estes as a substitute for an independent, contemporary first amendment analysis ignores Justice Harlan's parting caveat to his concurring opinion in Estes: "[The day may come when television will have become so
commonplace an affair in the daily life of the average person as to dissipate all reasonable likelihood that its use in courtrooms may disparage the judicial process." 381
U.S. at 595 (Harlan, J., concurring). The court also failed to consider the evolutionary
nature of constitutional interpretation, e.g., i. at 603-04 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (the
issue of cameras in the courtroom is "subject to continuous and unforeseeable
change").
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allowed in the courtroom. ' 12 1 In also rejecting a potential first
amendment right of the public to view televised judicial proceedings, Judge Oakes disagreed only with CNN's conclusion
while accepting many of its substantive premises. These arguments were: 1) that "the public... has First Amendment inter-

ests that are independent of the First Amendment interests of
speakers;"'' 1 2) that vital to the concern of the free speech
guarantee "is the corollary that there be full opportunity for
everyone to receive the message;" ' 3) that "the public's right
to receive information may not be vitiated by appeals to the
availability of alternative means for receipt of the information;" 124 and 4) that seven justices in Richmond Newspapers
recognized the press and public's qualified first amendment
right to attend criminal trials,1' a right subsequently extended
to civil trials.'2
Nevertheless, the court classified the purported first amendment right of electronic access as a "long leap [from Richmond
Newspapers and its progeny] ... that is not supported by history... [and one] we are not yet prepared to take.'12 The court
supported this conclusion by citing the opposition of federal
judges to electronic access as evidenced by a recently-issued report by the Ad Hoc Committee of the Judicial Conference of
the United States on Cameras in the Courtroom. 28 Judge
121. 752 F.2d at 21 (citing Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 581 (1965) (Harlan, J.,
concurring)).
122. 752 F.2d at 22 (referring to First National Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777
(1978) and Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 364 (1977)).
123. 752 F.2d at 22 (emphasis added) (quoting Young v. American Mini Theatres,
Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 76 (1976)).
124. 752 F.2d at 22 (citing Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 765 (1972)).
125. 752 F.2d at 22. See also supra notes 76-86 and accompanying text.
126. Publicker Ind., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059 (3d Cir. 1984). See also Richmond
Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 580 n.17; Gannett v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 386 (1979);
United States v. Mitchell, 551 F.2d 1252, 1258 (D.C. Cir. 1976), rev'd on other grounds
sub nom. Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978).
127. 752 F.2d at 23.
128. Id. at 23 (referring to REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE AD HOC COMMITTEE ON CAMERAS IN THE COURTROOM, Submitted to the Judicial Conference of the

United States, Sept. 19-20, 1984 [hereinafter AD HOC COMMITTEE REPORT]. The report
recommended the denial of a petition submitted by 28 television, radio, newspaper
and related organizations (including CNN) which advocated that Canon 3 A(7) of the
Code of Judicial Conduct for United States Judges, supra note 26 and infra notes 133
& 325, and Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, supra note 25, be
amended to allow electronic entry to federal courtrooms. The report did not consider
"legal issues," such as whether existing per se rules were constitutional. AD HOC
COMMITTEE REPORT at 2.
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Oakes stated that until the competing policy considerations
were found to favor the broadcasting of trials, coverage on an
experimental basis would be allowed providing it is approved
"by a district court, as opposed to an individual judge."'12 The
opinion concludes with a summary of its controlling argument:
[O]ur point is that until the First Amendment expands to include television access to the courtroom as a protected interest,
television coverage of federal trials is a right created by con-

sent of the judiciary, which has always had control over the
courtrooms, a consent which the federal courts, including the
Southern District of New York, have not given." °
In his concurring opinion, Judge Winter recognized that the
first amendment "is implicated in a request to televise" judicial
proceedings.' 3 ' Winter justified exclusion of television cameras
based upon a "time, place or manner" theory. 3 2 In support of
his view, he relied on the "cumulative years of experience" represented by the recommended bans on electronic trial coverage
by the Judicial Conference and Canon 3 A(7) of the Canons of
Judicial Conduct for the federal courts.1 33 Judge Winter recognized that "television may not be harmful in each and every
case."'- 4 But he argued that the pressures upon the trial judge
to allow access and on the parties to consent to television cover129. 752 F.2d at 23-24. Following the denial of CNN's petition and subsequent motion for reconsideration, the network petitioned the Board of Judges of the Southern
District of New York. The Board also refused to grant a waiver of Rule 7. Id. at 19.
130. Id at 24 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). This argument is somewhat
circular considering the fact that judges determine the scope of constitutional rights.
131. Id (Winter, J., concurring).
132. Id at 25 (Winter, J., concurring). See iftra notes 193-228 and accompanying
text.
133. 752 F.2d at 25 (Winter, J., concurring).
A judge should prohibit broadcasting, televising, recording, or taking photographs in the courtroom and areas immediately adjacent thereto during
sessions of court or recesses between sessions, except that a judge may authorize:
a. The use of electronic or photographic means for the presentation of
evidence, or for the perpetuation of a record; and
b. The broadcasting, televising, recording, or photographing of investitive,
ceremonial, or naturalization proceedings.
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES COURTS Canon 3 A(7) (1975). Judge
Winter's reliance on experience gained by excluding cameras from federal court
rooms is a strange barometer of the propriety of access. The federal courts' position
excluding cameras is also contradicted by the weight of experience gained from access
to state courtrooms. See infira notes 345-404 and accompanying text.
134. 752 F.2d at 25 (Winter, J., concurring). See also Westmoreland v. CBS, Inc.,
596 F. Supp. at 1168 (noting the fact that CMandler recognizes the harm from television coverage in some cases is not grounds for barring access in all cases).
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age would result in a de facto right of electronic entry in disregard of the dangers inherent in specific cases."a
C.

United States v. Edwards
In United States v. Edwards,1 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a district court's rejection of a journalist's request
to televise the fraud and racketeering trial of Louisiana Governor Edwin Edwards. The court of appeals held that the per se
prohibitions of Federal Rule 5311 and a local rule of court'-"
were not inconsistent with the first amendment. The court's
cursory rejection of a constitutional right of electronic access
was similar to the first part of the Hastings analysis: no
Supreme Court case has recognized a first amendment right to
broadcast trials,1 and Estes v. Texas, as reaffirmed in Nixon v.
Warner Communications, Inc.,140 expressly rejected such a
right.
Thus, the per se prohibition of electronic access from the federal courts has withstood constitutional challenge by courts using two lines of reasoning. In Westmoreland and Edwards the
courts rejected a first amendment right to broadcast trials
largely on the questionable precedential value of Estes v. Texas
and Nixon v. Warner Communications,Inc. In Hastings, the
Eleventh Circuit adopted a similar argument, but also added an
alternative rationale: the exclusionary rule could be justified as
a valid regulation of the time, place or manner of speech otherwise protected by the first amendment.
135. 752 F.2d at 25-26 (Winter, J., concurring).
136. 785 F.2d 1293 (5th Cir. 1986).
137. See supra note 25.
138. Local Rule 13.11 of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana prohibits "[t]he taking of photographs in the courtroom or its environs or radio or
television broadcasting from the courtroom or its environs during the progress of or in
connection with judicial proceedings."
139. 785 F.2d at 1295-96 (referring to Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Ct., 457 U.S.
596 (1982); Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560 (1981); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v.
Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980)).
140. 785 F.2d at 1295 (citing Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589,
610-11 (1978)). This reasoning is criticized infa notes 164-83 and accompanying text.
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IV
A Modern Constitutional Analysis of
Per Se Exclusion
A. Richmond Newspapers and the Scope of First
Amendment Access
In Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,14 1 the Supreme
Court recognized that there is a "presumption of openness"
which underlies the press and public's first amendment right to
attend judicial proceedings. 142 This presumption is an essential
starting point in an analysis of the breadth of first amendment
access. The threshold question is whether the right of public
"attendance" at judicial proceedings under Richmond Newspapers is limited to an individual's physical presence, or whether
it includes members of the public whose observation occurs
through viewing television coverage of the proceedings. The
guarantee that members of the public be allowed to attend in
person, 1 43 the recognized function that the press serves as a surrogate for the public,'4 and the inherent characteristics and
pervasive role of electronic media 45 militate in favor of an expansive interpretation of the right to attend trials.
The scope of the access afforded by Richmond Newspapers
can be interpreted broadly to include electronic access in light
of the Supreme Court's expressed understanding of contemporary media.' 46 Chief Justice Burger stated in his Richmond
141. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
142. Id at 573 (plurality opinion).
143. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
144. The function has been widely recognized and celebrated. See, e.g., Richmond
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 573 (1980) (plurality opinion); Gannett Co.
v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 397-98 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring); Houchins v. KQED,
Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 16-18 (1978) (Stewart, J., concurring) (press requires greater first
amendment protection than individuals when functioning as surrogate for the public);
Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491 (1975); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S.
817, 839 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (restraining the press is restraining the public,
"the true sovereign under our constitutional scheme"); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co.,
417 U.S. 843, 863 (1974) (Powell, J., dissenting). The Chandlercourt's failure to incorporate this tenet into its analysis is criticized in Pequignot, supra note 65, at 337. See
also Helle, The Newsgathering/PublicationDichotomy and Government Epression,
1982 DuKE L. J. 1, 36-37, 45 & 48; Weinstein and Zimmerman, supra note 15, at 161.
145. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978).
146. See, e.g., Choper, Kamisar & Tribe, Panel Discussion,3 SuP. CT. TRENDS &
DEvS. 249, 263-65 (1982); Zimmerman, supra note 15, at 655; Television and Newspaper Trial Coverage,supra note 65, at 528-29; Note, Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia: A Demarcation of Access, 34 U. MIAMI L. REv. 937, 953-54 (1980); Note,
Television Coverage of Trials: ConstitutionalProtectionAgainst Absolute Denial of
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Newspapers opinion that "[i]nstead of acquiring information
about trials by firsthand observation or by word of mouth from
those who attended, people now acquire it chiefly through the
print and electronic media. In a sense, this validates the media

claim of functioning as surrogates for the public.11 47 Electronic
access is further contemplated by Chief Justice Burger's description of the public aspect of press freedom to cover court-

room proceedings in Richmond Newspapers:
In guaranteeing freedoms such as those of speech and press,
the First Amendment can be read as protecting the right of
everyone to attend trials so as to give meaning to those explicit
guarantees. "[T]he First Amendment goes beyond protection
of the press and the self-expression of individuals to prohibit
government from limiting the stock of information from which
members of the public may draw."' 4

B. Electronic Media and the First Amendment
In examining the balance between the rights of free press
and fair trial, the ability of the electronic press to advance the

interests articulated in Richmond Newspapers and its progeny
is paramount. It is now clear beyond peradventure that television can provide greater public access than print media.

49

The role of the electronic press in our modern first amendment regime is qualitatively and quantitatively greater than
that of the print media.'50 Television exerts a pervasive influAccess in the Absence of a CompellingInterest, 30 VILL. L. REV. 1267, 1296-1303 (1985)
[hereinafter ConstitutionalProtectionAgainst Absolute Denialof Access].
147. 448 U.S. 555, 572-73 (1980) (plurality opinion). Accord id at 586 n.2 (Brennan,
J., concurring). See also id. at 577 n.12 (plurality opinion). Those interested in observing trials may be prevented from doing so by their work schedules, the limited seating
capacities in most courtrooms, and the high demand to attend most trials which generate a substantial amount of public interest. For example, at the trial of Judge Hastings, "[l]ines formed early each morning outside the courtroom and only the earliest
arrivals were allowed into the trial. The line remained outside the courtroom for the
duration of the trial. If any observer left during the trial, the next person in line was
allowed in." Julin, supra note 102, at 1303 n.2.
148. 448 U.S. at 575-76 (plurality opinion) (citing in part First National Bank of
Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978)). For substantial discussions of first amendment values, see United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938); Grosjean v.
American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936); T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION (1970); A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOV.

ERNMENT (1948); Z. CHAFEE, GOVERNMENT AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS (1947).

149. See infra notes 150-51 and accompanying text.
150. Roper surveys since 1963 have found television to be the number one news
source in America. See Ares, supra note 65, at 174 n.74 (citing ROPER ORGANIZATION,
PUBLIC PERCEPTION OF TELEVISION AND OTHER MASS MEDIA: A TwENTY YEAR RE-
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ence in our society by reason of both its broad reach and its
ability to stimulate our eyes and ears simultaneously. 51 Moreover, electronic media can transmit events as they occur, providing an unbroken path from the message source to the
viewer.
Where television coverage of trials is limited to brief summaries by news announcers spoken over sketches of trial participants, the medium's potential is not achieved. Viewers receive
information through the television medium, yet they are deprived of the medium's ability to capture and disseminate information in a manner which maximizes accuracy and captures
spontaneity.
In Westmoreland, the denial of electronic access prevented
members of the public, other than the few actually present in
the courtroom during the trial, from scrutinizing through audio-visual observation the testimony of current and former
prominent government officials, military officers and broadcasters. Similarly, in the Hastingsand Edwards trials, the public was unable to directly observe the quality of justice afforded
the federal judge and state governor, respectively, except by attending the trials in person. Instead, public observation was
limited to mere restatements and reprints of trial testimony
filtered through news persons and key witnesses. Where a
trial-a public event for which press access is guaranteed under
Richmond Newspapers--elicits a significant degree of public interest, fundamental first amendment principles dictate that
coverage of the event be reported in the most accurate fashion
VIEW, 1959-1979). See also Cable News Network v. American Broadcasting Co., 518 F.

Supp. 1238 (N.D. Ga. 1981), where the court held that electronic media had a right to
be included in the press pool for "limited coverage" White House events. The court
stated, "[I]t cannot be denied that television news coverage plays an increasingly
prominent part in informing the public at large of the workings of government. Many
citizens likely rely on television as their sole source of news." Id.at 1245. Accord
Estes, 381 U.S. 582, 589 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring).
151. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978) (broadcasting's "uniquely
pervasive presence"); Cable News Network, Inc. v. American Broadcasting Co., 518 F.
Supp. 1238, 1246 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (television conveys immediacy lacking in still photographs); Estes, 381 U.S. at 589 (Harlan, J., concurring) ("televising [trials] might well
provide the most accurate and comprehensive means of conveying their content to the
public"). See also Ares, supranote 65, at 173-74; Davis, supra note 15, at 86 (television
coverage conveys the "reality" of the courtroom more accurately than other media);
Wilson, supra note 15, at 296. It has also been suggested that the increased attention
given to courtroom proceedings by television coverage has spurred greater accuracy in
trial coverage by print media. National L.J., Jan 30, 1984, at 8, col. 2.
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technologically possible.5 2
Additionally, the potential gavel to gavel broadcasting of trials offered by cable television outlets such as CNN can provide
live, extended coverage"' generally not available on the overthe-air broadcast networks. Coverage by such cable outlets

would decrease the degree of editorial mitigation of the original
message which is endemic to nightly news broadcasts.
C.

Precedential Support for the Invalidity of Arbitrary
Restrictions on Access

Under Richmond Newspapers and Globe, arbitrary and absolute bans on press access to the courtroom are unconstitutional.M Rather, a case-by-case discretionary determination as
to whether the interests of the parties outweigh the interests of

the press and public is required. Although those decisions did
not expressly deal with electronic access, it is difficult to reconcile with this principle the inflexible prohibition of such access

as mandated by Rule 53 and the local rules implicated in Hastings, Westmoreland and Edwards.s
Richmond Newspapers and its progeny contemplate a broad
definition of "attendance" at trials.15M Further, Richmond
Newspapers articulated certain fundamental first amendment
5 7 in the trial context which can best be
policies and effects1
ad152. See Ares, supra note 65, at 173-74. In Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 765
(1972), the Court rejected the argument that the availability of an author's speeches
and books extinguishes the public's right to see and hear him speak in person. See
also Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 392 n.18 (1969) (citing J. MILL,
ON LIBERTY 32 (R. McCallum ed. 1947)); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 838 (1974)
(Douglas, J., dissenting); Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 597 n.22 (Brennan, J.,
concurring) ("the availability of a trial transcript is no substitute for a public presence
at the trial itself"). It should be noted, however, that under the time, place or manner
doctrine, discussed itfra notes 193-228 and accompanying text, the presence of "adequate" alternative avenues of dissemination is a factor in validating regulation of
speech. See infra note 216.
153. See Turner & Ornstein, The Supreme Court's Television Debut, CALIF. LAW.,
Nov. 1986, at 22, 58: "A 'law channel' seems no more far-fetched than do fine-arts,
stock-market and weather channels."
154. See supra notes 76-90 and accompanying text. See also ConstitutionalProtection Against Absolute Denial of Access, supra note 140, at 1296-1303.
155. See, e.g., Julin, supra note 102, at 1309. See also supra note 100 and accompanying text (discussing Hastings).
156. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
157. The Court has emphasized that press access to and coverage of trials may
serve cathartic and therapeutic functions for the public, enhance public acceptability
of trial results, enhance public scrutiny of judicial proceedings and function as a sur-
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vanced by electronic media.'-" Finally, in Richmond Newspapers, Chief Justice Burger recognized that significant
restrictions on the public's right to receive information and
ideas carry "a heavy burden of justification":
[I]n the context of trials ... the First Amendment guarantees

of speech and press, standing alone, prohibit government from
summarily closing courtroom doors. For the First Amendment
does not speak equivocally.... It must be taken as a command
of the broadest scope that explicit language,
9 read in the context of a liberty-loving society, will allow.1
In Globe, the Court held that a case-by-case evaluation must
be made as to whether press exclusion is necessary to protect
the asserted interest."s In Hastings and Edwards, neither trial
court determined whether electronic coverage would be prejudicial to the defendants.' 6 ' In Westmoreland, the trial judge
concluded that the particular facts of the case did justify granting CNN's petition to broadcast the trial. 62 Thus, the rulings in
Hastings, Westmoreland and Edwards upholding absolute
rules prohibiting electronic access in the absence of specific
findings violate the case-by-case evaluation requirement set
forth in Globe and the policy considerations enumerated in
Richmond Newspapers.1 63
In addition, these decisions ignore the ability of electronic
media to advance fundamental first amendment interests.
Where journalistic freedom to cover an institution as public in
nature as the judiciary is curtailed in an arbitrary manner, the
restriction cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny. As a legitimate, dominant news source, television cameras cannot be
summarily barred from a courtroom without violating the first
amendment.
rogate to members of the public who cannot attend trials in person. See supra notes
79-83 and accompanying text.
158. See supra notes 150-51 and accompanying text.
159. 448 U.S. at 576 (plurality opinion) (quoting in part, Bridges v. California, 314
U.S. 252, 263 (1941)) (footnote omitted). See also Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 615
(1965) (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("The idea of imposing upon any medium of communications the burden of justifying its presence is contrary to where I had always thought
the presumption must lie in the area of First Amendment freedoms") (emphasis
added).
160. 457 U.S. 606-07 (1982). See supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
161. Judge Hastings' consent to coverage rendered such an analysis unnecessary.
See supra note 96.
162. 596 F. Supp. 1166, 1170 (1984). See supra notes 112-16 and accompanying text.
163. See supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text.
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V
Defects in Federal Court Analyses Upholding
Exclusionary Rules
A.

Estes, Warner Communications and Chandler:
How Persuasive?

In excluding cameras from federal courtrooms in Hastings,
Westmoreland, Edwards and other cases,'6" the courts have
relied on inapposite authority. Primarily, the decisions have
cited Estes v. Texas '65for the proposition that there is no constitutional right of electronic access to the courtroom. 16 In addition, the courts have relied on Nixon v. Warner
Communications,Inc. 167 and Chandlerv. Florida'6Sto support
denial of electronic access. The first amendment discussions
set forth in Warner Communications and Chandler were essentially restatements of the Estes court's treatment of the issue.169 Therefore, if Estes no longer justifies denial of a
qualified first amendment right to broadcast trials, Warner
Communications and Chandlercannot justify per se exclusion.
The analysis of the current status of Estes begins with Chandler. Chandler's focus on due process issues appears to leave
the first amendment jurisprudence in Estes undisturbed. Even
so, Estes' rejection of a constitutional right of access is no
70
longer tenable. First, developments in television technology'
and the increased role of television in our society since Estes
was decided in 1965171 require reconsideration of the constitutional arguments for per se prohibition on electronic access to
the courtroom. Justice Harlan presciently recognized this in
the caveat to his concurring opinion in Estes: 'The day may
come when television will have become so commonplace an affair in the daily life of the average person as to dissipate all
reasonable likelihood that its use in courtrooms may disparage
164. See supra notes 93-140 and accompanying text.
165. 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
166. Edwards, 785 F.2d at 1295 (citing Estes, 381 U.S. at 589 (Harlan, J., concurring)); Westmoreland, 752 F.2d at 21 (citing Estes, 381 U.S. at 585-86 (Warren, C.J.,
concurring)); i& at 587 (Harlan, J., concurring)); Hastings, 695 F.2d at 1281 (citing
Warner Comminications, 435 U.S. at 609 (quoting Estes, 381 U.S. at 589 (Harlan, J.,
concurring))).
167. 435 U.S. 589 (1978).
168. 449 U.S. 560 (1981).
169. See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
170. See infra notes 282-83 and accompanying text.
171. See supra notes 150-51 and accompanying text.
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the judicial process.""
Second, the Estes majority did in fact acknowledge the existence of first amendment interests in the broadcasting of trials. 173 The Court merely subordinated these rights of the press
and public to the due process rights of criminal defendants. 17 4
The combination of subsequent advances in technology, Chandler's recognition that the broadcasting of trials is not inherently prejudicial to a criminal defendant, 7 5 Richmond
Newspapers' recognition of a first amendment right of press
and public access to criminal trials,7" and Globe's disapproval
of per se rules of exclusion 177 compels the conclusion that the
result reached in Estes can no longer be supported. Reconsideration is therefore required.
The Nixon v. Warner Communications,Inc. 178 decision cannot continue to justify exclusion of television cameras from
courtrooms for several reasons. Foremost is its lack of relevance. The issue before the Court was the media's asserted
right to physical possession of audio tapes entered as evidence- tapes gained by court order.' 79 Thus, the case is clearly
distinguishable from those involving the broadcasting of trial
proceedings, especially where the parties to the litigation consent to broadcast coverage.1i s Establishing a right to obtain
physical possession of evidence is clearly more difficult than establishing a right to communicate the events of a proceeding
already open to the general public.'' Additionally, the Court
in Warner Communications declined to fully evaluate first
172. 381 U.S. at 595 (Harlan, J., concurring). See also id, at 564 (Warren, C.J.,
concurring). In his dissenting opinion in Estes, Justice Stewart agreed that the issue
of cameras in the courtroom was "subject to continuous and unforeseeable change."
Id at 603-04 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
173. See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
174. Id.
175. 449 U.S. 560, 574 (1981).
176. 448 U.S. 555, 580 (1980).
177. 457 U.S. 596, 608 (1982).
178. 435 U.S. 589 (1978).
179. In re Subpoena to Nixon, 360 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C.), affd sub nom, Nixon v.
Sirica, 487 F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Transcripts of the Watergate tapes were given
wide publicity. See Warner Communications,435 U.S. at 609.
180. The trial court in Westmoreland noted the importance of the parties' consent
to the broadcasting of their trial, 596 F. Supp. at 1168. In Hastings,695 F.2d at 1281,
the court of appeals noted that Judge Hastings consented to the requested access, contrasting Warner Communications. Nevertheless, the Hastings court concluded that
the distinction did not undermine the precedential value of Warner Communica.
tions, id at 1284. See supra note 100.
181. See, e.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) (orders re-
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amendment interests in the context of the television medium.1 u Instead, the Court recited in dicta the rule set forth in
Estes-that only the right to publish what is gathered from the
courtroom by non-electronic means enjoys constitutional protection.'83 As Estes' first amendment jurisprudence decays, so
does the precedential value of Warner Communications.
Nor is Chandler v. Florida persuasive support for the validity of per se rules which bar cameras from the courtroom.
Chief Justice Burger's majority opinion did not directly reject a
first amendment right of electronic access. Rather, it noted
that allowance of electronic coverage of trials in Florida was
not premised upon the first amendment.l" Moreover, the issue
in Chandler was the validity of access, not the validity of
exclusion.
In summary, Estes v. Texas and its progeny can no longer be
interpreted as foreclosing a first amendment right to broadcast
trials, in light of societal and technological changes as well as
the right of access recognized in Richmond Newspapers. Thus,
the federal courts of appeals in Hastings, Westmoreland and
Edwards erred in relying on Estes, Warner Communications
and Chandler to uphold local rules of court prohibiting electronic access.
B. The Flawed Application of the "Time, Place or
Manner" Doctrine
In Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court,1w the Supreme
straining media from publishing information gained during open trial proceedings are
strongly presumed to be unconstitutional).
182. The first amendment discussion in Warner Communications was limited to
the right to obtain copies of the Watergate tapes. See supra note 100.
183. "The First Amendment generally grants the press no right to information
about a trial superior to that of the general public... 'and within [the courtroom] a
reporter's constitutional rights are no greater than those of any other member of the
public."' 435 U.S. at 609 (quoting Estes, 381 U.S. at 589). This doctrine has been criticized for ignoring the press' function as a surrogate for the public. See supra note 144
and accompanying text.
184. 449 U.S. 560 (1981).
185. Id at 569. The Court pointed out that the Florida Supreme Court predicated
its allowance of electronic access on its supervisory authority over the state's courts.
First amendment grounds were asserted and rejected by the state supreme court as a
basis for access in reliance upon Estes and Warner Communications. See In re Petition of Post-Newsweek Stations, Florida, Inc., 370 So.2d 764, 774 (Fla. 1979). The
United States Supreme Court also noted Post-Newsweek's reliance on Warner Communications, 449 U.S. at 569.
186. 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
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Court held that denial of press access to judicial proceedings is
valid only if it is "necessitated by a compelling governmental
interest and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.' 181

7

In

Press-EnterpriseCo. v. Superior Court, s'the Court further
stated:
[Tihe presumption [of access] may be overcome only by an
overriding interest based on findings that closure is essential to
preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that
interest. The interest is to be articulated along with findings
specific enough that a reviewing court can determine whether
the closure order was properly entered. 8 9
Under this standard, the per se rules barring electronic access
to the courtroom upheld in Edwards, Westmoreland and Hastings cannot be sustained. '9 The standard mandates that the
trial court make specific findings as to the manner in which
press access threatens protected interests in the case at bar. In
upholding the inflexible prohibition on electronic access in Edwards, Westmoreland and Hastings,the courts of appeals considered only whether interests perceived to be common to all
televised trials, such as preservation of order and decorum in
the courtroom,19 ' justified the blanket ban on access. The respective courts did not pass on whether the interests enumerated were threatened in the specific cases before the trial
courts. As per se rules preclude trial judges from undertaking
to exercise their discretion, 192 they violate the requirement that
the trial judge make specific findings that closure is necessitated by the need to preserve other governmental interests.
For the same reasons, per se rules violate the requirement that
closure orders be narrowly tailored.
A lesser standard of review than the strict scrutiny required
by Globe and Press-Enterprise was applied by the majority
187. Id.at 606-07.
188. 464 U.S. 501 (1984) (extending the right of access recognized in Richmond
Newspapers and Globe to voir dire proceedings).
189. Id.at 510.
190. See Julin, supra note 102, at 1307 n.13; ConstitutionalProtectionAgainst Abso.
lute Denial of Access, supra note 146, at 1299.
191. See, e.g., Hastings, 695 F.2d at 1283. The court also noted "the institutional
interest in procedures designed to increase the accuracy of the essential truth-seeking
function of the trial," id. (footnote omitted), another concern not evaluated with reference to the case at bar.

192. See, e.g., Westmoreland, 596 F. Supp. at 1170.
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opinions in Hastings,9 ' United States v. Kerley,194 and in Judge
Winter's concurring opinion in Westmoreland.'95 These opinions concluded that a per se prohibition of electronic access to
the courtroom could be sustained as a reasonable regulation of
the manner in which protected speech is exercised.'6 A careful look at Hastings, Kerley, and the Richmond Newspapers
line of cases illustrates the confusion among courts and commentators as to the proper standard of review"" in applying a
time, place or manner analysis to electronic access. While the
proper test for excluding electronic access to the courtroom
under the time, place or manner doctrine remains an open
question, application of either of the two possible standards
demonstrates the invalidity of mandatory exclusion.
First, a time, place or manner regulation is only valid if it is
"content-neutral."' 19 Thus, the doctrine--applying a lesser
standard of scrutiny-may be properly invoked only if prohibition of televised trial coverage is aimed at protecting interests
unrelated to the suppression of ideas.1 9 Of the various interests asserted to justify exclusion, ° some are primarily related
to the suppression of speech while others clearly are not.
Commentators have urged that prohibitions on electronic access are not content-neutral because the electronic media conveys messages in an entirely unique manner 201 which cannot be
duplicated in traditional "oral or written descriptions. ' 20 2 Ac193. 695 F.2d at 1282-84.
194. 753 F.2d 617, 620-22 (7th Cir. 1985) (upholding denial of criminal defendant's
request to photograph, record and broadcast his trial). See supra note 92. The court
noted specifically that a limitationon access, unless based on content, is not subject to
strict scrutiny, as is a denial of access altogether. Id. at 620.
195. 752 F.2d 16, 24-26 (2d Cir. 1984) (Winter, J., concurring).
196. See supra notes 193-95 and accompanying text. See also Camerasin the Criminal Courtroom, supra note 13, at 1560 n.104; ConstitutionalProtectionAgainstAbsolute Denial of Access, supra note 146, at 1298-99.
197. Judge Winter, concurring in Westmoreland, did not specifically identify the
standard of review used in his analysis.
198. See, e.g., City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 925, 928 (1986);
Clark v. Community For Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 295 (1984); City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 805-06 (1984). These cases take a very narrow view of content, inlfra note 213. See also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAw 580-82, 682-88 (1978).
199. See, e.g., Clark, 468 U.S. at 295; United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377
(1968); L. TRIBE, supra note 198, at 582, 682-88.
200. See irfra notes 240-87 and accompanying text.
201. See supra notes 150-51 and accompanying text; Julin, supra note 102, at 1307
n.13; Zimmerman, supra note 15, at 668.
202. Zimmerman, supra note 15, at 668.
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cordingly, regulation of live television's unique message is content-based. Regulations prohibiting electronic access are
content-based if their purpose is to preserve the dignity of judicial proceedings by avoiding the possibility that trials, once televised, would be perceived by the public as entertainment
programming. 20 3 The fear that televised trial proceedings will
turn public sentiment against a particular party in a caseother than where such prejudice would impair the court's ability to impanel an impartial jury-is similarly a content-based
rationale for exclusion. 2 " In addition, the exclusion of cameras
because of the desire of trial participants-including judges--to
avoid public scrutiny" 5 is not content-neutral unless such desire is related to privacy interests.206
Alternatively, the primary rationale for excluding cameras
from the courtroom can be viewed as unrelated to suppression
of content; that is, to ensure the fair administration of justice.
Specifically, several interests sought to be protected are directly tied to ensuring the parties' rights to a fair trial.m Such
interests include preserving order in the courtroom,2 0 eliminating distraction caused by noise and movement z° and
preventing certain behavioral effects caused by the presence of
television cameras among trial participants.2 10
Despite the arguments that regulations prohibiting electronic access are content-based,2 1 ' it appears that the primary
purpose for excluding cameras from the courtroom is to protect
litigants' fair trial rights,2 12 an interest unrelated to the sup203. See infra notes 275-77 & 401 and accompanying text.
204. However, the restriction is content-neutral to the extent it is aimed at the
court's ability to empanel an impartial jury for retrials following a televised trial, a
due process interest unrelated to content. For a discussion of the retrial of Klaus Von
Bulow following the national coverage via cable television of his first trial, see M.
KRONENWerrER, supra note 21, at 71-75 (1986).
205. See infra note 289.
206. But see infra note 271 and accompanying text.
In addition to the theories stated supra notes 201-05, access restrictions may be content-based to the degree that electronic access to trials is prohibited, but allowed for
other courtroom proceedings. See, e.g., Recommendation D of the Judicial Conference, 87 F.R.D. 519, 536 (1980) (permitting electronic access to ceremonial and naturalization proceedings occurring in the courtroom).
207. See, e.g., Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. at 575-77; Estes, 381 U.S. at 540.
208. "Decorum" interests include maintaining quiet and order in the courtroom.
See infra notes 275-83 and accompanying text.
209. See inifra notes 281-83 and accompanying text.
210. See infra notes 240-74 and accompanying text.
211. See supra notes 201-06 and accompanying text.
212. See, e.g., Chandler,449 U.S. at 574-75, 577, 581-82; Hastings, 695 F.2d at 1283.
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pression of speech.21 3 Therefore, a lower level of scrutiny may
be applied under the time, place or manner doctrine.1 4 However, it is unclear whether the applicable standard of review is
the prevailing time, place or manner standard, or a more narrow approach for regulating access discerned from the Richmond Newspapers line of cases.
The Supreme Court has stated that time, place or manner

regulations are valid provided they are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech, are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and leave

.open ample alternative channels for communication of information. 1 5 Under this prevailing standard, even assuming con-

tent-neutrality, per se rules which prohibit electronic access fail
Richmond Newspapers also Identified a content-neutral interest-the fair administration of justice-as a basis for imposing limitations on press access to trials. See infra
text accompanying note 222.
213. This Is especially true considering that per se regulations may not be contentbased by definition. Or City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 925 (1986)
(content neutrality refers to a speaker's viewpoint, not an entire class of speech).
214. Specifically, cameras may be barred from the courtroom as a regulation of the
manner of access otherwise guaranteed by Richmond Newspapers and its progeny.
215. See, e.g., Renton, 106 S. Ct. at 928; Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 295 (1984); City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789,
805-06 (1984).
The Hastings court adopted a similar test, holding that a restriction on access to the
courtroom is constitutional if it is reasonable, promotes significant governmental interests and does not "unwarrantly abridge ...the opportunities for the communication of thought." 695 U.S. at 1282 (quoting Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 581
n.18). There is some internal tension in this standard: "reasonableness" implies application of minimal scrutiny while an intermediate level of scrutiny is seemingly required by the subsequent two prongs of the test. The Hastings court cited Justice
Stewart's concurring opinion in Richmond Newspapers as authority for the reasonableness requirement, 695 F.2d at 1282 n.9 (citing Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at
600 (Stewart, J., concurring) ("fj]ust as a legislature may impose reasonable time,
place, and manner restrictions upon the exercise of First Amendment freedoms, so
may a trial judge impose reasonablelimitations upon the unrestricted occupation of a
courtroom by representatives of the press and members of the public") (emphasis
added by the Hastings court)), and seemed to apply minimal scrutiny. As discussed
infra notes 222-26 and accompanying text, it is unclear whether Richmond Newspapers and its progeny endorse a traditional time, place or manner limitation on courtroom access, or an analogous, more limited approach. With regard to the prevailing
time, place or manner standard, the reasonableness requirement seems superfluous,
subsumed in the actual test to be applied. See, e.g., Clark, 468 U.S. at 295. Alternatively, if a narrower approach is compelled by Richmond Newspapers, infra notes 22526 and accompanying text, a lower, reasonableness standard may be proper. See
United States v. Kerley, 753 F.2d 617, 620-21 (7th Cir. 1985). The approach taken by
the Hastings court evidences confusion as to the meaning of Richmond NewspapersHastings' primary authority for application of a time, place or manner analysis-as to
whether the proper level of scrutiny is minimal under a reasonableness test, or intermediate under the prevailing time, place or manner standard.
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on at least two grounds.216 As stated above, a per se prohibition
by definition is not narrowly tailored.2 1 7 Second, an examination of the relevant policy considerations2 " and the success of
state court experimentation with electronic trial coverage 19 indicates that the purportedly significant governmental interests
furthered by exclusion are illusory. In fact, it appears that significant governmental, as well as societal, interests are advanced by access.2 °
The Hastings court cited dicta from Globe and Richmond
Newspapers as grounds for applying a time, place or manner
analysis.22 However, the court overlooked important language
in these cases and, consequently, failed to apply key principles
articulated by the Court.
Chief Justice Burger's plurality opinion in Richmond Newspapers concluded with a footnote stating[O]ur holding today does not mean that the First Amendment
rights of the public and representatives of the press are absolute. Just as a government may impose reasonable time, place,
and manner restrictions upon the use of its streets in the interest of such objectives as free flow of traffic... so may a trial
judge in the interest of the fair administration of justice, im216. The first prong, content-neutrality, is discussed supra notes 198-213 and accompanying text. Because television coverage of trials is qualitatively superior to coverage by print media or by television reporting, supra notes 150-51 and accompanying
text, one can argue that such existing "channels" are not "adequate" alternatives.
However, the Supreme Court has been quick to find the existence of adequate alternative avenues of communication in recent cases. See, e.g., Renton, 106 S. Ct. at 932;
Taxpayersfor Vincent, 466 U.S. at 812; id.at 2136-37 (Brennan, J., dissenting); FCC v.
Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 746 (1978). Courts have traditionally found print media
and analogous broadcast coverage to be "adequate." See, e.g., Estes, 381 U.S. at 539-40
(1965). But see generally Television and Newspaper Trial Coverage,supra note 65.
217. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
218. See infra notes 229-310 and accompanying text.
219. See infra notes 345-404 and accompanying text.
220. See infra notes 288-306 and accompanying text. The Hastings court, which
reached the contrary conclusion, relied heavily on the obsolete Estes decision in this
regard. 695 F.2d at 1283-84 (citing Estes, 381 U.S. at 544-50 (truth-seeking function of
trials may be adversely affected by television coverage), id.at 545 (impact of television
coverage on trial participants may be too subtle to be detected)). The Hastings court
also cited Chandler in support of its conclusion. However, the court cited to portions
of the Chandler opinion which either merely summarized the Estes doctrine, 695 F.2d
at 1283 (citing Chandler,449 U.S. at 575-78 (summarizing Estes, 381 U.S. at 544-50)), or
expressed uncertainty as to the effects of televised trial coverage, 695 F.2d at 1283
(citing Chandler,449 U.S. at 578).
221. 695 F.2d at 1282 (citing Globe, 457 U.S. at 607 n.17; Richmond Newspapers,448
U.S. at 600 (Stewart, J., concurring)).
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pose reasonable limitations on access to a trial.2 2 2

The meaning of the dictum, repeated in Justice Stewart's concurring opinion and cited in Globe, is unclear. Construed
broadly, as was done by the Hastings court, the language endorses application of a traditional time, place or manner analysis to electronic access to the courtroom.
Yet, as discussed
above, characterizing inflexible rules prohibiting electronic access to the courtroom as mere manner restrictions cannot justify exclusion under the prevailing standard of review.2 z

Alternatively, the Court in Richmond Newspapers and Globe
may have stated a narrower caveat to the right of access right it
established. The relevant and consistent language in these
opinions intimates that restrictions of press access are merely

analogous to time, place or manner restrictions, and extend
only to prevent courtroom noise and overcrowding.as Under
this view, per se exclusion of television cameras is invalid un-

less such access is shown to disturb the proceedings. The state
experiments with eletronic trial coverage have widely refuted
222. 448 U.S. at 581 n.18 (emphasis added).
223. See supra note 215. The third prong of the test adopted by the Hastings
court-that a restriction on access not unwarrantly abridge opportunities for communication of thought-is language from Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574 (1941),
cited by Chief Justice Burger in the concluding footnote to the plurality opinion in
Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. 581-82 n.18. Arguably, the language is inapposite to
the context of televised trials. The complete sentence in Cox, quoted by the Chief
Justice, reads in pertinent part, ".

.

. the opportunities for the communication of

thought and the discussion of public questions immemorially associated with resort
to public places." Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 581-82 n.18 (quoting Cox, 312
U.S. at 574) (emphasis added). This statement, in its entirety, refers to the regulation
of speech in a public forum, e.g., United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983), which a
courtroom is not. See Westmoreland, 752 F.2d at 21-22 (public forum interest in courtroom speech may be a speaker's right, but does not extend to the press as representatives of the public). Thus, insofar as the Chief Justice appears to apply doctrine
applicable to public fora, which courtrooms are not, the Hastings court erred in relying upon the non-sequitur in formulating its time, place or manner standard of
review.
224. See supra notes 215-20 and accompanying text.
225. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 581 n.18 (plurality opinion) (language
quoted supra text accompanying note 222); id. at 600 (Stewart, J., concurring). Accord
Globe, 457 U.S. at 607 n.17 ("limitations on the right of access that resemble 'time,
place, and manner' restrictions.., would not be subjected to strict scrutiny") (emphasis added). See also Fenner & Koley, Accegs to JudicialProceedings: To Richmond
Newspapers and Beyond, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 415,444-46 (1981). This language
may also be construed more broadly to include activities in the courtroom which have
adverse psychological effects on trial participants. Note, Globe Newspaper: Sounding
the Death Knell for Closure in Courtroom Proceedings?, 3 PACE L. REv. 395, 412
(1983).
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the idea that television cameras are prohibitively disruptive.2 z
Also important is the admonition of four justices in Richmond Newspapers that the trial judge, not the reviewing court,
must determine whether restrictions on access are reasonable. 227 Thus restrictions on access should be within the sound
discretion of the trial judge. The per se prohibition of electronic access is thus per se invalid because it prevents the trial
judge from exercising his discretion by determining whether
the restriction on access is reasonable. 228
In summary, per se rules prohibiting electronic access to the
courtroom violate the compelling governmental interest standard articulated in Globe. A per se prohibition of cameras from
the courtroom is also invalid as a time, place or manner, or
analogous- restriction. Under the prevailing time, place or manner test, a per se regulation is invalid because it neither advances significant governmental interests nor is narrowly
tailored to further the purported governmental interests. A
narrower test under Richmond Newspapers and its progeny
would permit a trial judge to bar cameras in order to prevent
excessive noise and overcrowding in the courtroom. The Hastings and Kerley courts and Judge Winter's concurring opinion
in Westmoreland erred by failing to correctly apply any of
these possible standards.

VI
Policy Considerations: The Unproven Dangers of
Cameras in the Courtroom
Courts and commentators have focused on various policy
considerations in examining the constitutionality of permitting
cameras in the courtroom.2 9 In Estes v. Texas,230 the Supreme
Court held that various dangers231 purportedly occasioned by
226. See infra notes 393-94 and accompanying text.
227. 448 U.S. 581 n.18 (plurality opinion); id. at 600 (Stewart, J., concurring).
228. In Westmoreland, for example, the trial judge found that exclusion of cameras from the courtroom was not justified. 596 F. Supp. 1166, 1167-70 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
229. See, e.g., Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560 (1981); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532
(1965); Westmoreland v. Columbia Broadcasting, Sys., Inc., 752 F.2d 16, 23 (2d Cir.
1984); United States v. Hastings, 695 F.2d 1278, 1282-84 (11th Cir. 1982).
230. 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
231. The policy issues set forth in Estes include the psychological impact of cameras in the courtroom upon trial participants; other adverse effects upon the trial
judge, jurors, criminal defendants, witnesses and attorneys; the impact of electronic
coverage upon the dignity and decorum of judicial proceedings; the effect of television
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electronic trial coverage violated the defendant's right to due
process. Fourteen years later, the Florida Supreme Court in In
re Petitionof Post-Newsweek Stations,Florida,Inc., held to the
contrary.2- The Florida Supreme Court concluded that, on balance, a modern policy analysis illustrates that electronic coverage is not only constitutionally permissible but also desirable.A2
Finally, in Chandler v. f/orida a the United States Supreme
Court held that the harm caused by electronic access to the
courtroom may be sufficient in specific instances to prohibit
such coverage, but only if affirmatively proven.m The Court
stated, "Whatever may be the 'mischievous potentialities [of
broadcast coverage]...' no one has been able to present empiri-

cal data sufficient to establish that the mere presence of the
broadcast media inherently has an adverse effect on that
process."=
The empirical data referred to by the Chandlercourt may, as
a practical matter, be impossible to gather.237 The purpose of
judicial proceedings-to adjudicate legal rights-precludes
methodologically correct experimentation. 2as

Further, it is

questionable whether the potentially deleterious effects of
broadcast coverage of trials can be isolated from other forms of
jury prejudice.' 9
A.

Potential Dangers
1. Impact On Trial Participants
One supposed threat posed by electronic access to trials is the

coverage of trials upon the general public; and administrative concerns. See supra
notes 50-57 and accompanying text.
The conclusions reached in this Note require only a summary of the conflicting
viewpoints, as the relevant policy considerations have received extensive treatment in
other articles. See, e.g., authorities cited supra note 15.
232. 370 So.2d 764, 774-80 (Fla. 1979). In reaching a conclusion contrary to Estes,
the Florida Supreme Court relied on results of a two-year pilot program permitting
cameras in the state's courtrooms. The program is described infra notes 349-63 and
accompanying text.
233. Id. at 780.
234. 449 U.S. 560 (1981).
235. Id. at 574-75, 578-79, 582.
236. Id. at 578-79 (quoting in part Estes, 381 U.S. at 587).
237. Note, however, that a substantial body of information has been gathered by
the states based on observations of trial participants. See infra notes 389-404 and accompanying text.
238. COandler,449 U.S. at 577.
239. Barber, The Problem of Prejudice7 A New Approach in Assessing the Impact
of Courtroom Cameras, 66 JUDICATURE 248, 254-55 (1983).
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possibility that the mere knowledge that proceedings are being
televised will alter the behavior of the participants.2 ° Feared
reactions range from intimidation and inhibition of witnesses2 1
to showboating and grandstanding by attorneys.242 Such behavior may alter the course of the trial and impede the basic factfinding goal of the proceeding. These concerns appear to be unwarranted. The greater weight of authority indicates that during the course of courtroom proceedings most participants are
not overly conscious of or influenced by the presence of television cameras.243
Opponents of cameras in the courtroom argue that electronic
access will distract the judge,2 " increase the judicial workload245 and provide a forum for judges to pursue political
goals.2 Opponents urge that when the decision of whether or
240. The Chandler court noted, "If it could be demonstrated that the mere presence of photographic and recording equipment and the knowledge that the event
would be broadcast invariably and uniformly affected the conduct of participants so as
to impair fundamental fairness, our task would be simple .
" 449 U.S. at 575.
241. See, e.g., Kamisar, supra note 74, at 163.
242. See, e.g., Estes, 381 U.S. at 566 (Warren, C.J., concurring); id.at 591 (Harlan, J.,
concurring); Douglas, The Public Trial and the FreePress,33 ROcKY MTN.L. REV.1, 8
(1960).
243. See, e.g., In re Petition of Post-Newsweek Stations, Florida, Inc., 370 So.2d 764,
775 (Fla. 1979) ("the assertions are but assumptions unsupported by any evidence").
See also Buchanan, Pryor, Meeske & Strawn, The FloridaEperiment, TRIAL, Apr.
1979, at 34; Goldman & Larson, News Camera in the Courtroom During State v.
Solorzano: End to the Estes Mandate?,10 S.W.U.L. REV. 2001,2039-42 (1978); Graham,
"Yes, Bring Them In," Cameras in the Courtroom-A Dialogue, 64 A.B.A.J. 545, 547
(1978); Turner & Ornstein, supra note 153, at 24; A Comprehensive Approach, supra
note 65, at 127-28. See also infra note 395.
Judge Stanley C. Soderland presided over a mock trial in the state of Washington
and observed, "I found that I completely forgot the presence of the news media as
soon as I was called upon to take some action. Participants in a trial get so absorbed in
what they are doing that the presence of a camera is going to fade into the background." D'Alemberte, CamerasIn The Courtroom, 9 LrIIGATION 20, 21 (Fall 1982).
CY Fretz, "No, or at Least a Cautious 'Only If '"Camerasin the Courtroom. A Dialogue, 64 A.B.A.J. 549, 550 (1978).
244. Estes, 381 U.S. at 548; Fatzer, supra note 15, at 239.
245. Estes, 381 U.S. at 548. This point was a primary concern of the Court in Estes:
"[The trial judge's] job is to make certain that the accused receives a fair trial. This
most difficult task requires his undivided attention. Still when television comes into
the courtroom he must also supervise it." Id.
246. This fear was articulated by Justice Douglas five years prior to Estes. Douglas,
supra note 242, at 10. See also Estes, 381 U.S. at 548-49; id,at 565-66 (Warren, C.J.,
concurring). f.
Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 357 (1956):
[N]o judge fit to be one is likely to be influenced consciously except by what
he sees and hears in the court and by what is judicially appropriate for his
deliberations. However, judges are also human, and we know ...how powerful is the pull of the unconscious and how treacherous the rational process.
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not to allow electronic coverage rests with the trial judge, media pressure will unduly influence his discretion.247 Beyond
this, opponents fear that once cameras gain access to the courtroom, media considerations will abridge a degree of the presiding judge's control over the conduct of the trial.2
These dangers have proven to be unfounded. Judges who are
monitored by a viewing audience may actually perform their
duties more effectively, as they feel compelled to be more alert
and attentive. 49 Many judges are actually "educated" by their
experience with cameras in their courtrooms; after presiding
over a televised trial, those who initially voiced apprehension
or opposition expressed approval of access.
The issue of the potential impact of coverage on the function
of jurors has also elicited a divergence of opinion. Opponents of
access argue that prejudice may arise when an unsequestered
jury views rebroadcasts of trial proceedings."' Jurors may feel
pressured to render a verdict in accord with public sentiment,
especially in notorious trials.2 5 2 Jurors may even fear or actually experience physical threats to deliver such verdicts. In
The Court in Pennekamp reversed a contempt judgment against the Miami Herald
for publishing editorials critical of judges.
247. In Estes, Justice Clark framed this notion as the initial tap of a domino theory:
Our judges are high-minded men and women. But it is difficult to remain
oblivious to the pressures that the news media can bring to bear on them
both directly and through the shaping of public opinion. Moreover, where
one judge in a district or even in a State permits telecasting, the requirement
that the others do the same is almost mandatory. Especially is this true
where the judge is selected at the ballot box.
381 U.S. at 548-49. See also Westmoreland v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 752
F.2d 16, 26 (2d Cir. 1984) (Winter, J., concurring). These concerns are less significant
when applied to federal judges, who enjoy lifetime tenure. U.S. CONST., art III, § 1.
248. This concern was expressed even by judges who were not opposed to television coverage of trials. In re Petition of Post-Newsweek Stations, Florida, Inc., 370 So.
2d 764, 770 (results of survey of Florida circuit judges). Cf Davis, supra note 15, at 86
(cartoon of judge announcing from the bench, "We'd like to welcome a new station
today-KCHTV in Fall Creek!").
249. Alabama Judge Robert Hodnette observed that the presence of cameras during a murder trial over which he presided "kept me and all the courtroom personnel
on our toes." TImE, Feb. 9, 1981, at 5, as quoted in A Comprehensive Approach, supra
note 65, at 128-29. See also infra note 395.
250. For an example, see Loewen, Cameras in the Courtroom: A Reconsideration,
17 WASHBURN L.J. 504, 505-06 (1978).
251. Estes, 381 U.S. at 546; Post-Newsweek, 370 So.2d at 777.
252. Estes, 381 U.S. at 545 ("Where pre-trial publicity of all kinds has created intense public feeling which is aggravated by the telecasting or picturing of the trial the
televised jurors cannot help but feel the pressures of knowing that friends and neighbors have their eyes upon them"). Accord id at 592-93 (Harlan, J., concurring). See
also Fatzer, supra note 15, at 238 (studies indicate that increased public awareness of a
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sensational trials, they may presume the guilt of the accused
based solely on the fact that the trial is being televised.25 Obtaining an impartial jury for retrials may be more difficult after
a televised trial.2 - 4
Proponents counter these charges by pointing out that jurors
can and should be excluded from coveragem and sequestered
to prevent viewing of rebroadcasts and accompanying commentary. It is doubtful that television coverage of trials will become so popular as to preclude the availability of an impartial
jury.
Whether knowledge that a trial is being televised may deter
the shy witness from coming forward to testify in such a case 256
or intimidate such a witness once on the stand is, again, uncertain.2 Proponents of coverage contend that witnesses will actually receive better treatment when cameras are rollingm and
that coverage may bring the trial to the attention of key witnesses not previously discovered by the litigants.2 9 According
decision increases the possibility that individuals will conform their opinions to what
they believe the group believes).
In one civil action in Florida, a jury verdict of $1.6 million was thought to result
from the jury's desire to return a "newsworthy verdict" in order to gain additional
television publicity. BROADCASTING, Oct. 17, 1977, at 24-25.
253. See Estes, 381 U.S. at 545.
254. Estee, 381 U.S. at 546-47; Fatzer, supra note 15, at 239; Tongue & Lintott, supra
note 15, at 800. But see Post-Newsweek, 370 So.2d at 777 (noting that widespread publicity of the Watergate hearings was held not to have unduly prejudiced the jury pool
for the subsequent trials of H.R Haldeman, John Ehrlichman and John Mitchell).
255. This is the current practice in some state courts. See, e.g., Post-Newsweek, 370
So.2d at 787-89 (Fla. 1979); State v. Newsome, 177 N.J. Super. 221, 426 A.2d 68 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1980) (jurors may not be photographed without their consent).
See also Hoyt, ProhibitingCourtroom Photography:It's Up to the Judge in Florida
and Wisconsin, 63 JUDICATURE 290, 295 (1980) (Wisconsin and other states prohibit
televising of jurors unless they "specifically and individually" consent); Comment,
ConstitutionalLaw: Television on Trial-Camerasin the Courtroom, 21 WAHBURN
L.J. 419, 424 (1982). See also infra note 398 and text accompanying note 414.
256. See Estes, 381 U.S. at 547; Tongue & Lintott, supra note 15, at 790-91 (describing a "chilling effect" of trial coverage on the availability of key witnesses):
Even now one of the serious problems of law enforcement is that many persons who witness crimes do not want to "get involved," particularly if they
live or work in the area so as to be subject to retaliation. This problem easily
could be compounded by the realization of these persons that "to get involved" may result in the televising of their testimony.
257. See infra note 397.
258. Tornquist & Grifall, supra note 15, at 367.
259. Kamisar, supra note 74, at 163. Trial publicity in general has been recognized
as enabling key witnesses not otherwise called to testify to learn of testimony they
know is false, and to enable them to come forward to rebut the perjured testimony.
Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 570 n.8 (plurality opinion) (citing 6 J. WIGMORE,
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to one study, television coverage may even enhance witnesses'
ability to recall pertinent facts.' °
Rules promulgated by the various states which allow broadcast coverage of trials 261 vary in regard to whether or not the
consent of witnesses is required for their testimony to be televised,2 2 and the issue has been widely debated.26a However,
most courts2z and commentators' have agreed that certain
types of witnesses-for example, minors, victims of sexual assault and those whose testimony could possibly endanger their
lives, threaten national security or reveal trade secrets-should
be excluded from electronic coverage.2 66
Predictions that television coverage of trials will generate
inappropriately self-indulgent conduct on the part of attorneys
have not been borne out by experience.2 7 Attorneys with a
propensity for theatrics do not need the presence of cameras to
play to the courtroom theater.268 Moreover, attorneys may be
EVIDENCE § 1834, at 436 (Chadbourn rev. 1976)); id. at 596-97 (Brennan, J., concurring)

(quoting In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270 n.24 (1948)); Douglas v. Wainwright, 714 F.2d
1532, 1541-42 (11th Cir. 1983). The substantial reach of television could further advance this function of trial publicity.
260. Hoyt, Courtroom Coverage: The Effects of Being Televised, 21 J. BROADCASTING 487, 493 (1977). In Professor Hoyt's experiment, witnesses reported greater recall
when testifying while television cameras were present than when cameras were absent. Id.
261. See infa notes 326-44 and accompanying text.
262. See, e.g., Nevas, supra note 15, at 49; Zimmerman, supra note 15, at 703; Cameras in State and Federal Courtrooms,supra note 113, at 406-08.
In Post-Newsweek, the Florida Supreme Court established a "qualitative difference"
test:
The presiding judge may exclude electronic media coverage of a particular
participant only on a finding that such coverage will have a substantial effect
upon the particular individual which would be qualitatively different from
the effect on members of the public in general and such effect will be qualitatively different from coverage by other types of media.
370 So. 2d at 779. The test is praised, although some decisions applying it are criticized
in Cohen, Cameras in the Courtroom and Due Process:A Proposalfor a Qualitative
Difference Test, 57 WASH. L. REV. 277, 288 (1982). The criticized decisions are State v.
Palm Beach Newspapers, Inc., 395 So.2d 544 (Fla. 1981) (exclusion of cameras upheld
when prison inmates claimed coverage of their testimony would subject them to reprisals); State v. Green, 395 So.2d 532 (Fla. 1981) (presence of cameras constitute a denial
of due process by rendering the accused incompetent to stand trial).
263. See generally authorities cited supra note 15.
264. E.g., Chandler, 449 U.S. at 577; Post-Newsweek, 370 So.2d at 779.
265. E.g., Hoyt, supra note 255, at 294-95; Tornquist & Grifall, supra note 15, at 361.
266. See infra note 341-44 and accompanying text and text accompanying note 413.
267. See infra note 396 and accompanying text.
268. Barber, supra note 239, at 255 (studies have not shown that cameras make
attorneys more flamboyant); J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 138 (1949). One commentator has asserted that if attorneys grandstand, the bar should respond by demanding
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more conscientious and thorough in preparing their cases
knowing that their work will receive broad exposure to the
general public.269
Concern has also been expressed as to whether the televising
of trials violates trial participants' rights of privacy.2 0 However, a challenge to electronic access on the basis of asserted
privacy rights would be unconvincing under established constitutional doctrine,271 especially considering the inherently public nature of trials

coverage of

jurors273

72

and the recommended exclusion from

and certain types of witnesses. 274

2. The Threat to the Dignity and Decorum
of JudicialProceedings
One long-held fear is that the televising of trials will detract
from the dignity and decorum of judicial proceedings.275 Some
opponents, including jurists, have stated that the courts should
not be the subject of commercial exploitation.276 Another conthat attorneys demonstrate a greater degree of professionalism in the courtroom, not
by excluding cameras from the proceedings. M. KRONENWE7rER, supra note 21, at 93.
269. Tornquist & Grifall, supra note 15, at 366.
270. See generally Ares, supra note 65, at 181 (compelling interest in prohibiting
coverage of certain types of witnesses such as young rape victims); Power, supra note
15; Comment, Television and Newsreel Coverage of a Trial,43 IOWA L. REV. 616, 624
(1958). See also United States v. Kleinman, 107 F. Supp. 407 (D.D.C. 1952) (discharging citation for contempt of Congress of witness who refused to testify before Senate
committee investigating organized crime in televised hearings). (f.H.R. RULE XI, c.3
(rules of the U.S. House of Representatives prohibit televising a witness over his or
her objection).
271. See, e.g., Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975). See also PressEnterprise Co. v. Superior Ct., 464 U.S. 501 (1984) (privacy interests did not justify
closure of all but three days of voir dire proceedings); Globe Newspaper Co. V. Superior Ct., 457 U.S. 596 (1982); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976); Craig v. Harney, 331
U.S. 367 (1947); Zimmerman, supra note 15, at 690-93; A Comprehensive Approach,
supra note 65, at 125; Tornquist & Grifall, supra note 15, at 358. But see Estes, 381 U.S.
at 585-86 (1965) (Warren, C.J., concurring); Note, Camerasin the Courtroom: Guidelinesfor State Criminal Trials, 84 MICH. L. REV. 475, 488-90 (1985) [hereinafter Guidelines for State Criminal Trials].
272. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. 555 (1980); Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374
(1947) ("A trial is a public event. What transpires in the courtroom is public
property").
273. See supra note 255 and accompanying text.
274. See supra text accompanying notes 264-66.
275. See, e.g., Canon 35: Cameras, Courts and Confusion, supra note 26; Douglas,
supra note 242, at 1, 3 & 6 (cited with approval in Estes, 381 U.S. at 541).
276. "There would be a real threat to the integrity of the trial process if the television industry and trial judges were allowed to become partners in the staging of criminal proceedings." Estes, 381 U.S. at 573-74 (Warren, C.J., concurring). See also
Douglas, supra note 242, at 9; infra note 401 (Justice Stanley Mosk dissenting from
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cern is that televised trials may be perceived as entertainment
rather than news by a confused public. 77 A related fear is that
only the most sensational or newsworthy trials or portions
thereof will garner sufficient public interest to be broadcast.278
These concerns are misplaced. Newspaper coverage of trials
consists primarily of excerpts, which often emphasize the sensational and rarely include a complete transcript.2

79

No differ-

ent from print in this respect, electronic media, by necessity,
selectively edit vast quantities of information for dissemination.
This process is substantially free from government intervention or limitation.2s
Whether television coverage will adversely affect the dignity
and decorum of courtroom proceedings is dependent upon
whether electronic media personnel and equipment remain
physically unobtrusive. But this is a matter well within the
control of the jurisdiction-under rules promulgated to regulate electronic access-and the presiding judge. Courts and
commentators share near unanimous opinion that, contrary to
the disruptive capabilities evident at the trial of Billy Sol Estes, 2sl the danger of physical disruption has virtually disappeared.1 2 This is largely due to advances in television
the California Supreme Court's decision to allow experimental coverage of oral argument before the state high court).
277. See, e.g., Estes, 381 U.S. at 571-72 (Warren, C.J., concurring); Gerbner, supra
note 15, at 417-18.
278. See Chandler,449 U.S. at 580: "[s]election of which trials, or parts of trials, to
broadcast will inevitably be made not by judges but by the media, and will be governed by..

. factors ...

[which will have] the effect... to titillate rather than to

educate and inform." See also Estes, 381 U.S. at 594-95 (Harlan, J., concurring);
Fatzer, supra note 15, at 235; Gerbner, supra note 15, at 420; A Comprehensive Approach, supra note 65, at 134; But see Davis, supra note 15, at 87; Wilson, supra note
15, at 295 ("this... is a concern more for judicial public relations than in [sic] communicating the truth").
It should be noted that many trials of broad public interest involve the rights or
interests of a large number of people, involving the conduct of public officials or large
corporations.
279. Davis, supra note 15, at 89; Tate, supra note 19, at 928.
280. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974); Columbia
Broadcasting Sys., Inc., v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 124 (1973).
281. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
282. See, e.g., Chandler, 449 U.S. at 576-77; Westmoreland, 752 F.2d at 18; PostNewsweek, 370 So.2d at 775. See also Graham, supra note 243, at 546 (cameras are
even less distracting than "the exotic machines employed by stenographic reporters");
Fretz, supra note 243, at 550; Julin, supra note 102, at 1306; Note, Televised Trials
Constitutional Constraints, Practical Implications, and State Eperimentation,9
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 910, 925 (1978). See also infra note 393.
Electronic media coverage of trials may actually reduce disruption by allowing "the
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technology and broadcasters' willingness to pool coverage to
eliminate large numbers of personnel and equipment from the
courtroom.m
3. Administrative Considerations
The televising of trials raises further concerns in the area of
the general administration of the judiciary. These concerns include the purported increase in litigation, necessitated by required judicial determinations of whether coverage should be
allowed (including appeals) and the expense of sequestering
juries.'
While these considerations are legitimate, their persuasive
force on the larger issue of whether trials should be televised is
insufficient to bar access in all cases. First, reviewable judicial
rulings are required for a wide range of other issues during
trial.m In resolving these other issues, concern over judicial
economy is not relevant and, similarly, should not be an important factor in justifying denial of electronic access. Second, jurors are commonly sequestered for non-televised trials of
significant public interest.2' Finally, matters of administrative
cost or judicial inconvenience, unless of constitutional dimensions, cannot in themselves outweigh the first amendment interests2 8 7 which mandate finding per se rules of exclusion

constitutionally infirm.
B. Potential Benefits
1. Educational Value
The potential educational value of electronic access is frequently suggested as one of its primary benefits. 2 s" Televised
trials enable the public to receive more accurate accounts of
press herd" to view the proceedings via closed circuit from a room in close proximity
to the courtroom and by minimizing the demand for statements from the parties
while entering and leaving the courthouse. Davis, supra note 15, at 92.
283. Id.
284. Tongue & Lintott, supra note 15, at 799; Guidelinesfor State Criminal Trials,
supra note 271, at 490-91.
285. Judicial discretion is commonly exercised for matters pertaining to discovery
requests, evidence privileges and relevancy. Cameras in State and Federal Courtrooms, supra note 113, at 423.
286. Weinstein & Zimmerman, supra note 15, at 165.
287. See supra notes 81-83, 150-51 and accompanying text.
288. E.g., Post-Newsweek, 370 So.2d at 779; Ares, supra note 65, at 173-74; Loewen,
supra note 250, at 510; Tornquist & Grifall, supra note 15, at 355. See also infra notes
401-02 and accompanying text.
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courtroom proceedings than those provided by print media and
television news accounts, which do not include footage of the
proceedings. Accordingly, such access can educate a public
largely ignorant about the conduct of state and federal trials.2
Direct personal experience of courtroom proceedings among
non-lawyers is minimal. Alternatively, fictional images of
court proceedings proliferate on a spate of popular television
programs ° and recent films.21
Arguably, the purported educational benefits resulting from
the televising of trials are incomplete, as asserted in Estes.m
Opponents of electronic access claim that brevity of coverage,20
coverage of primarily sensational trials2" and the lack of access
to written documents such as pleadings and motions, or trial
289. Howell T. Heflin, United States Senator (D-Ala.) and former Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court of Alabama, wrote:
There is no field of governmental activity about which the people are so
poorly informed as the judicial branch. It is highly inconsistent to complain
of the ignorance and apathy of the people concerning the judiciary, and then
to close the windows of information through which they might observe and
learn.
Heflin, FairTrial v. FreePress: Time for a Rehearing?,61 JUDICATURE 154,155 (1977).
U.S. District Judge Jack B. Weinstein of the Eastern District of New York laments
"the cult of the robe," a sense of elite isolation sought by judges which in turn transforms modern court procedure into "a mysterious private rite." Weinstein & Zimmerman, supra note 15, at 156-57 (quoting in part, J. FRANK, supra note 268, at 254).
Accord Kielbowicz, supra note 19, at 23. A 1978 survey conducted by Yankelovich,
Skelly and White for the National Center for State Courts indicates that erroneous
beliefs about the judiciary are widely held, including- 37% believed a person accused
of committing a crime was guilty until proven innocent; 72% thought the United
States Supreme Court can review and reverse any decision made by a state court; and
30% believed that the job of a district attorney is to defend an accused criminal who
cannot afford an attorney. Tate, supra note 19, at 927. See also Post-Newsweek, 370
So.2d at 781.
290. E.g., LA. Law (Twentieth Century Fox Television 1986), Night Court (Starry
Night Prods. in association with Warner Bros. 1984) and Matlock (Viacom 1986) are
prime time network programs which feature fictional characters and legal matters.
Peoples' Court (Ralph Edwards Prods. 1981), Divorce Court (Blair Entertainment Co.
1984) and Superior Court (Ralph Edwards/Stu Billett Prods. 1986) are nationally syndicated programs which purport to present the adjudication of actual legal
controversies.
291. Recent films containing substantial portrayals of courtroom proceedings include The Verdict (Twentieth Century Fox 1982), Jagged Edge (Columbia Pictures
1985) and Legal Eagles (Universal Studios 1986).
292. 381 U.S. at 575 (Warren, C.J., concurring); id.at 594-95 (Harlan, J., concurring).
293. See, e.g., Day, supra note 15, at 20; Tongue & Lintott, supra note 15, at 785.
294. See, e.g., Estes, 381 U.S. at 494-95 (Harlan, J., concurring); Gerbner, supra note
15, at 420-22.
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conferences, precludes complete understanding of trials.20 Opponents further contend that the function of trials is not to educate the public.I Nevertheless, in the final analysis the
judiciary is part of our system of government and, as such,
should provide the people with an opportunity to see how it
operates. If efficiency is a concern, it is hard to imagine a more
efficent manner of illustrating the mechanics of the American
system of justice than electronic access to the courtroom.
2. IncreasingPublic Confidence in the Judiciary
In Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,' the Supreme
Court stressed the importance of maintaining public confidence
in the judiciary.29a In his plurality opinion, Chief Justice Burger observed, "People in an open society do not demand infallibility from their institutions, but it is difficult for them to
accept what they are prohibited from observing." 2 " In his concurring opinion, Justice Brennan added:
For a civilization founded upon principles of ordered liberty to
survive and flourish, its members must share the conviction
that they are governed equitably. That necessity... mandates
a system of justice that demonstrates the fairness of the law to
our citizens. One major function of the trial, hedged with procedural protections and conducted with conspicuous respect
for the rule of law, is to make that demonstration.'
Electronic media are uniquely capable of advancing the interests articulated in Richmond Newspapers.30 1 In opening the
courtroom to the television camera, the public is able to gain a
level of access exceeded only by personal observation. Even the
mere opportunity to observe proceedings has a tendency to increase public confidence. 30 2 Electronic access can quantitatively and qualitatively enhance the public's opportunity to
295. In fact, viewers would be placed in roughly the same position as juries which,
similarly, do not have access to pleadings, pre-trial motions or bench conferences.
296. Estes, 381 U.S. at 575 (Warren, C.J., concurring). Commentators have suggested that education about the legal system can be advanced more effectively by
means other than the televising of trials. See, e.g., Fatzer, supra note 15, at 243.
297. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
298. Id. at 572 (plurality opinion); id. at 594-95 (Brennan, J., concurring). See also
supra note 1 and accompanying text.
299. 448 U.S. at 572 (plurality opinion) (cited with approval in Press-Enterprise Co.
v. Superior Ct., 464 U.S. 501, 509 (1984)).
300. 448 U.S. at 594-95 (Brennan, J., concurring).
301. See supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text.
302. See Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 570-72 (plurality opinion); id.at 595
(Brennan, J., concurring).
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s3 Consequently, public confidence can be maximized
observe.~
by allowing television into the courtroom. Once inside, confidence can be further heightened by the public's observation of
portions of the trial itself, enabling "justice [to] satisfy the appearance of justice." so 4

3.

Enhancing the Fact-FindingFunction of Trials

As discussed above, the presence of television cameras in the
courtroom can enhance the fact-finding function of trials.3m
Judges may be more attentive, attorneys better-prepared, some
witnesses able to remember more details and others alerted to
the need to come forward to testify. Whether trial participants'
performance is actually enhanced by the knowledge that the
general public is monitoring their actions is not subject to proof
to the degree required to satisfy either proponents or objec-

tors.-"( But it follows that if performance is enhanced, the ability of our judicial system to ascertain the truth will also be

enhanced.
C.

Summary
In accord with Chandlerv. Florida,°7 the potential dangers

of electronic access remain speculative and cannot continue to
justify the per se ban on access upheld in United States v. Hastings,3 08 Westmoreland v. Columbia Broadcasting System,
Inc. 309 and United States v. Edwards.1 0 Moreover, the effects
of access may very well be salutary. Therefore, the reliance
placed upon policy considerations in those decisions was
erroneous.

VII
Electronic Trial Coverage of State Courts
The widespread ban on electronic access to federal court303. 448 U.S. at 594-95 (Brennan, J., concurring).
304. Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954) (cited with approval in Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 571-72 (plurality opinion); id at 594 (Brennan, J.,
concurring)).
305. See Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 596-97 (Brennan, J., concurring). See
also supra notes 256-60 and accompanying text.
306. See upra notes 237-39 and accompanying text.
307. 449 U.S. 560, 576-77 (1981). See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
308. 695 F.2d 1278 (11th Cir. 1983). See supra notes 93-104 and accompanying text.
309. 752 F.2d 16 (2d Cir. 1984). See supra notes 105-35 and accompanying text.
310. 785 F.2d 1293 (5th Cir. 1986). See supra notes 136-40 and accompanying text.
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rooms 1

stands in stark contrast to the permissive climate
among the states.3 1 A survey of the history and status of television cameras in state courtrooms is useful for three reasons.
First, the widespread acceptance and successful practice of electronic coverage in state courtrooms ably refutes federal court
rulings3 1 3 that the unproven dangers of electronic trial coverage
pose a sufficient threat to the fair administration of justice to
support per se exclusion.314 Second, state experimentation has
generated a body of data which evidences the substantial absence of specific harmful effects of electronic access proferred
by the federal courts and opponents.3 1 5 Finally, state experimentation and implementation of rules providing for electronic
access316 provide models which the federal courts and states
which do not presently permit access can look to in structuring
their own pilot programs.3 1 7

A.

Summary of Televised Trial Coverage

In the late seventies, and prior to the Supreme Court decision
in Chandler v. f/orida,318 many states began experimenting
with electronic trial coverage.3 19 This experimentation oc311. See supra notes 92-140 and accompanying text.
312. See infra notes 318-44 and accompanying text. For an extensive discussion of
state regulations permitting televised trial coverage, see Guidelinesfor State Ciminal Trals, supra note 271.
313. E.g., United States v. Edwards, 785 F.2d 1293 (5th Cir. 1986); Westmoreland v.
Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 752 F.2d 16 (2d Cir. 1984); United States v. Hastings,
695 F.2d 1278 (11th Cir. 1983).
314. See infra notes 318-44 and accompanying text.
315. See infra notes 389-404 and accompanying text. Recognition by the federal
courts of the successful state experiments-and reforms based thereon-will give content to the Supreme Court's frequent admonition that the states are laboratories of
criminal (and civil) justice, contributing to better procedures in the courts throughout
the United States. See, e.g., Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. at 579 (citing New State Ice
Co. v. LAebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 172 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring).
316. See infra notes 326-44 and accompanying text.
317. See, e.g., infra notes 345-88 and accompanying text.
318. 449 U.S. 560 (1981) (television coverage of a criminal trial over the defendant's
objection does not violate due process absent a showing of actual prejudice). See
supra notes 64-75 and accompanying text.
319. States which allowed electronic coverage of trial proceedings on experimental
or permanent bases between 1976 and 1979 included Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Minnesota, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Washington, West Virgina and
Wisconsin. Summary of Cameras in the State Courts 3-4 (October 1,1986) (available
from the National Center for State Courts, Williamsburg, Va.) [hereinafter Summary
of Cameras]. See also News Media Coverage of Judicial Proceedings With Cameras
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curred despite the apparent prohibition by the Court in Estes v.
Texas 320 and the recommended ban by the American Bar Association.321 The success of such coverage and the blessing given
to state experimentation in Chandler322 led to further experimentation and adoption of permanent rules permitting electronic access.' s Finally, in August of 1982, the ABA repudiated
its longstanding recommended ban on cameras in the courtroom3 24 and amended Canon 3 A(7) to give trial judges author-

ity to allow electronic access in specific cases under guidelines
ensuring due process-s=s
As of January 7, 1987, forty-three states permitted televised
trial coverage on a permanent or experimental basis.3s Of
and Microphones: A Survey of the States (January 7,1987) (available from the RadioTelevision News Directors Association, Washington, D.C.) [hereinafter News Media.
Coverage of JudicialProceedings]. For further discussion of electronic trial coverage
in Florida, see irfra notes 349-63 and accompanying text. Colorado adopted permanent rules allowing electronic coverage in 1956. See supra note 28.
The changing attitude of state judicial systems during the late seventies in favor of
permitting television coverage of trials was reflected by the Conference of State Chief
Justices' passage of a resolution in 1978, by a vote of 44 to 1 (with one abstaining), to
allow the highest court of each state to promulgate standards for electronic trial coverage. THIRTIETH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE CONFERENCE OF CHIEF JUSTICES, Resolution I, Television, Radio, Photographic Coverage of Judicial Proceedings (Burlington,
Vt., Aug. 2, 1978).
320. 381 U.S. 532 (1965). See supra notes 37-63 and accompanying text.
321. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
322. 449 U.S. at 582.
323. Thirty-three states promulgated experimental or permanent rules for electronic trial coverage following the Chandler decision. Summary of Cameras,supra
note 319, at 3-4.
324. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
325. The ABA House of Delegates adopted the new Canon 3 A(7) of the Canons of
Judicial Conduct by a vote of 162 to 112. Canon 3 A(7) presently reads, in pertinent
part:
A judge should prohibit broadcasting, televising, recording or photographing
[of judicial proceedings] in courtrooms and areas immediately adjacent
thereto... consistent with the right of the parties to a fair trial and subject to
express conditions, limitations, and guidelines which allow such coverage in a
manner that will be unobtrusive, will not distract the trial participants, and
will not otherwise interfere with the administration of justice.
News Media Coverage of JudicialProceedings,supra note 319, at 3. On February 7,
1986, the executive committee of the National Conference of State Trial Judges-part
of the ABA's Judicial Administration Division-adopted a model rule permitting electronic access to state courtrooms. Id. at 4.
326. Id. at B-1. Thirty-three states have adopted permanent rules, while fourteen
have experimental coverage rules. Alaska, Kansas, Minnesota and Utah have both
experimental and permanent rules. States which continue to prohibit televised trial
coverage are Indiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Texas (audio recording permitted in appellate courts), Virginia and the District of
Columbia (petition for access pending in the district's courts). Id. at B-2, B-4.
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these, thirty allow coverage in both trial and appellate courts,arl
while eleven permit cameras only in appellate courts.3 2 Almost all states which allow some type of electronic coverage
have adopted rules or guidelines to govern access, sm addressing
concerns such as the type and placement of media equipment
and the number and movement of equipment operators.3w The
judge is given discretion to control the coverage during the
course of the proceedings in all jurisdictions permitting electronic access. 3 1
Of particular interest are the areas in which rules for electronic trial coverage vary from state to state. Variation lies primarily along two lines: 1) the consent of certain trial
participants as a prerequisite to electronic access, and 2) the
prohibition on electronic coverage for certain types of legal proceedings or witnesses.
1.

Consent Requirements

In Chandler,the Supreme Court held that televised coverage
of a criminal trial over a defendant's objection does not necessarily violate due process.
Nevertheless, seven of the twentynine states which allow electronic coverage of criminal trials
and appeals" require the consent of the accused.- Twentyfive states require consent of the court as an absolute pre-condition to access.m Some states also require consent of the prosecutor,se parties to a civil action or criminal appeal, a or
327. Id. at B-i, B-3.
328. Id at B-1, B-4. Pennsylvania permits electronic access only to its trial courts.
Id, at B-3.
329. Summary of Cameras, supra note 319, at 2. See also Guidelines for State
Criminal Trials, supra note 271, at 505-16 (advocating that the states implement a
uniform set of regulations).
330. Id
331. Id at 510.
332. See supra notes 70-75 and accompanying text.
333. News Media Coverage of JudicialProceedings,supra note 319, at B-6 - B-7, B10 n.24.
334. Id at B-10. The states which require a criminal defendant's consent are Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Georgia, Minnesota, Oklahoma and Tennessee. Several
states which initially required the defendant's consent during experimental periods
revoked the requirement in order to allow coverage of more trials. See, e.g., infra
notes 351 & 380 and accompanying text (Florida & California).
335. Id at B-8 - B-9. Mere prior notice of media intent to televise a court proceeding is required in ten states. Id
336. Five states require consent of the prosecutor. Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas,
Georgia and Tennessee. Id at B-11.
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counselm as a prerequisite to electronic access. In addition,
some states require a witness' consent to have his or her testimony televised.
Many states do not allow coverage of the
jury in a manner by which any juror may be identified.340
2. Exclusion in Special Circumstances
Television cameras are barred from many state courtrooms
which otherwise allow access in special circumstances which
reflect particular concern for the interests of trial participants.
Electronic media are excluded due to the nature of the legal
controversy, the identity of certain witnesses, or the type of judicial proceeding involved. In regard to the first category,
many states prohibit coverage of legal matters relating to the
family, such as adoption, divorce, child custody and juvenile
proceedings. 41 Cases involving sex crimes and trade secrets
are exempted from television coverage in eight statesYw Witnesses exempted from coverage in many states include police
informants, relocated witnesses, undercover agents, minors and
witnesses in jeopardy of serious bodily harm. 43 Judicial hearings other than trial or appellate proceedings are exempted
from coverage by some states.
B.

Experimental Programs
One of the most important observations gained from studies

337. Five states require consent of a party to a civil action or civil appeal: Alabama,

Arkansas, Maryland, Minnesota and Tennessee. Id. at B-12.
338. Consent of counsel is required in three states: Alabama, Arkansas and Tennessee. Id. at B-14.
339. Id. at B-15 - B-16. Fourteen states require that witnesses consent to have their

testimony televised; some states require consent only for victims of sexual offenses
(Iowa) or other crimes (Maryland). Id In New Mexico, the trial judge retains discretion to exclude coverage of certain witnesses, such as victims of sexual offenses and
their families, police informants, undercover agents, relocated witnesses and
juveniles. Id. at B-16 n.52. Consent of a sexual offense victim is required to have his
or her testimony televised in Alaska. Id at B-15. Florida's "qualitative difference"
standard for witness exclusion is discussed supra note 262.
340. Id. at B-17 - B-18 (12 states). See also Guidelinesfor State Criminal Trials,
supra note 271, at 497-99.
341. Id. at B-19 - B-21.
342. Id at B-23.
343. Id. at B-22 - B-25.

344. Id. at B-22, B-24 - B-25. The exempted proceedings include motions to suppress (seven states), in camera proceedings (four states), proceedings before magistrates (one state), probable cause hearings (two states), motions to dismiss (three
states), voir dire hearings (nine states), motions in limine (two states) and hearings
on admissibility of evidence (Minnesota).
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of cameras in state courtrooms is the manner in which electronic media have gained access. Of the forty-three jurisdictions which permit electronic trial coverage, all but nine first
instituted experimental programs which consisted of televised
34
coverage of actual trials for a period of one year or longer. 5
Most of the programs were conducted under the auspices of the
state's highest court or judicial council, with those bodies
promulgating temporary or permanent rules for electronic coverage.346 In many states, special committees were formed to
implement guidelines for experimental coverage, oversee pilot
programs and report their findings to the state body authorizing the program. 347
Finally, the adoption of permanent rules allowing electronic
coverage in a majority of states, 348 following successful experimental periods, indicates the ability of electronic media to
cover trial proceedings without impeding the fair administration of justice. Three examples of states whose successful experimental programs led to the adoption of permanent rules
permitting televised trial coverage-Florida, Massachusetts
and California-are illustrative and instructive.
1. Florida
The experimental program conducted in Florida remains the
most visible to date349 and has evoked much commentary.= In
April of 1979, after four years of consideration and experimentation with cameras in the state's courtrooms, 35' the Supreme
345. Summary of Cameras, supra note 319, at 3-4. See also News Media Coverage
of JudicialProceedings,supra note 319, at A-5 - A-88.
346. News Media Coverage of JudicialProceedings,supra note 319, at A-5 - A-88.
347. For example, see the discussions of experimental programs in Florida, Massachusetts and California, inlfra notes 349-88 and accompanying text.
348. Fifteen states have extended the experimental periods rather than adopting
permanent rules. Summary of Cameras, supra note 319, at 4. Five of these states
have extended their experimental programs indefinitely. Id.
349. Unlike virtually all other pilot studies, Florida's experimental program was
summarized in a published opinion by the state's highest court, In re Petition of PostNewsweek Stations, Florida, Inc., 370 So.2d 764 (Fla. 1979). The state's coverage rules
were upheld in Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560 (1981), discussed supra notes 64-75
and accompanying text.
350. E.g., Graham, supra note 243, at 545; Comment, From Estes to Chandler:
Shifting the ConstitutionalBurden of Courtroom Cameras to the States, 9 FLA. ST. I.
REv. 315 (1981); Whisenand, F/orida'sExperience with Camerasin the Courtroom,64
A.B.A.J. 1860 (1978).
351. On January 24, 1975, Post-Newsweek Stations, Florida, Inc. petitioned the
Florida Supreme Court to amend Florida's existing Canon 3 A(7) to permit electronic
access to the state's courtrooms or, in the alternative, for the court to reexamine the
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Court of Florida issued a lengthy opinion which concluded by
amending Florida's Canon 3 A(7) to permit electronic access to
the state's courtrooms on a permanent basis.z Amendment of
the Canon was premised not on "constitutional imperative,"
but on the supreme court's power over the state's courts.m
The court grounded its decision on both an analysis of survey
data gathered from trial participants during the course of the
pilot study~- which evidenced a lack of serious problems of
disruption during trial proceedingsm--as well as the perceived
ability and desirability of televised coverage of trials to inform
the public about judicial proceedings.m
The court first summarized the survey data received from
Canon. Post-Newsweek, 370 So.2d at 765-66. The court authorized an on-site experimental program to consist of the televising of one criminal and one civil trial subject
to specific guidelines, including the consent of all participants. Petition of Post-Newsweek Stations, Florida, Inc., 327 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1976). The experiment failed due to the
inability to obtain party consent to coverage, Post-Newsweek, 370 So.2d at 766. Consequently, the court revoked the consent requirement and entered an interlocutory decision invoking a one-year pilot program to begin on July 1, 1977. Petition of PostNewsweek Stations, Florida, Inc., 347 So.2d 402 (Fla. 1977).
352. Post-Newsweek, 370 So.2d at 781. Canon 3 A(7), as amended states:
Subject at all times to the authority of the presiding judge to (i) control the
conduct of proceedings before the court, (ii) ensure decorum and prevent distractions, and (iii) ensure the fair administration of justice in the pending
cause, electronic media and still photography coverage of public judicial proceedings in the appellate and trial courts of this state shall be allowed in
accordance with standards of conduct and technology promulgated by the
Supreme Court of Florida.
FLORIDA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3 A(7) as cited in 370 So.2d at at 781.
353. 370 So.2d at 774.
354. The opinion referred to an extensive survey of trial participants, excluding
judges, during the pilot program. Id. at 767 n.4 (citing A Sample Survey of the Attitudes of Individuals Associated With Trials Involving Electronic Media and Still
PhotographyCoverage in FloridaBetween July 5, 1977 and June 30, 1978 (Nov. 1,
1978) (available from the National Center for State Courts, Williamsburg, Va.) [hereinafter A Sample Survey], and a separate survey of the state's circuit judges, Post
Newsweek, 370 So.2d at 769-70 (citing Report of the Florida Conference of Circuit
Judges). The former survey was conducted by the Judicial Planning Coordination
Unit of the Office of the State Courts Administrator and included data from 1,349
questionnaires returned by attorneys, witnesses, jurors and court personnel. 370
So.2d at 768.
355. I& at 781.
356. Id. The court statedIn reaching our conclusion we are not unmindful of the perceived risks articulated by the opponents of change. However, there are risks in any system
of free and open government. A democratic system of government is not the
safest form of government, it is just the best man has devised to date, and it
works best when it citizens are informed about its workings.
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trial participants"' and judges. m Next, it analyzed constitutional considerations, concluding that due process concerns
could not justify exclusion absent a demonstration of prejudice.359 The court also held that neither first nor sixth amendment considerations provided an affirmative right of access.w°

Finally, it evaluated various policy considerations againstel and
in favor of

62

electronic trial coverage in light of the survey re-

sults. The court concluded that "on balance there is more to be
gained than lost by permitting electronic media coverage of ju357. Id. at 768-69. The court listed sixteen findings from the survey of the trial
participants, including. (1) the presence of electronic media had little effect upon survey respondents' perception of the judiciary or dignity of the trial proceedings; (2)
electronic media coverage disrupted the proceedings slightly or not at all; (3) respondents' awareness of the presence of electronic media averaged between slight and
moderate; (4) jurors' ability to judge the truthfulness of witnesses and concentrate on
their testimony was perceived to be unaffected; ... (6) the presence of electronic media made jurors and witnesses feel slightly more responsible for their actions;... (8)
electronic media distracted jurors almost not at all, and distracted witnesses and attorneys slightly,... (14) court personnel perceived that attorneys acted slightly more
flamboyant than during trials not covered by electronic media; .... and (16) court
personnel and attorneys felt witnesses were slightly inhibited by the presence of electronic media; jurors were perceived as slightly self-conscious, nervous and distracted
but also slightly more attentive. Id. at 768-69 (citing A Sample Survey, supra note 354,
at § II. A.1, questions 1-8, 10, 13, 15 and § II. A.2., questions 2, 7, 13-16). The court
pointed out that the results were not scientific but only reflected the respondents'
attitudes and perceptions of cameras in the courtroom. 370 So.2d at 768.
358. The position of the Florida Conference of Circuit Judges, submitted in a report filed with the court, opposed amendment of Canon 3 A(7) to permit electronic
access. 370 So.2d at 770. However, the court noted that this stance was not supported
by data collected from the member judges, "particularly
from respondentswho experienced electronic media coverage." Id. (emphasis added).
359. Id. at 774. The court's conclusions that Estes did not announce a per se ban
and that actual prejudice was required to support a violation of due process, anticipated the same conclusions drawn by the United States Supreme Court in Chandler.
See supra notes 64-75 and accompanying text.
360. 370 So. 2d at 774. The court relied upon Estes and, to a greater degree, Warner
Communications, to summarily reject a constitutional right of access.
361. 370 So.2d at 774-79. The court found that: (i) physical disruption was minimal; (ii) concerns over the psychological impact of electronic coverage on trial participants were unsubstantiated; (iii) commercial exploitation of trial coverage by
electronic media is not greater than exploitation of the courts by print media; (iv)
problems of prejudicial publicity were not appreciably increased by televised coverage
compared with print coverage; (v) the effect of electronic coverage of cases involving
particular categories of witnesses justified concern but is insufficient to bar electronic
access in all cases; and (vi) privacy rights of trial participants are minimal in the context of press coverage of judicial proceedings. Id.
362. Id. at 779-81. The court emphasized the traditional openness of trial proceedings, the important role televised trial coverage may serve in educating the public
about the court system, and its ability to enhance public confidence in the state's

judiciary.
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dicial proceedings subject to standards for such coverage."
2. Massachusetts
In November 1982, following a two-year experimental program,-'" the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachussetts adopted
a new Canon 3 A(7) s to permit the broadcasting of courtroom
proceedings. The new canon was adopted by the court upon
363. Id at 780. The court promulgated standards for equipment and conduct to
govern electronic coverage of trial proceedings in an appendix to its opinion. ICE at
792-95. The standards include provisions for equipment and personnel, sound and
lighting, location of equipment, personnel, movement during proceedings, restrictions
on coverage of attorney-client conferences, impermissible use of media material and
appellate review of orders excluding electronic access. Id
364. The program was summarized in an untitled report submitted to the state
high court by the Advisory Committee to Oversee the Experimental Use of Cameras
and Recording Equipment in Courtrooms to the Supreme Judicial Court (available
from the National Center for State Courts, Williamsburg, Va.) [hereinafter Advisory
Committee Report].
365. The amended Canon 3 A(7) provides:
A judge shall permit broadcasting, televising, electronic recording, or taking photographs of proceedings open to the public in the courtroom by the
news media for news gathering purposes and dissemination of information to
the public, subject, however, to the following limitations:
(a) A judge may limit or temporarily suspend such news media coverage, if
it appears that such coverage will create a substantial likelihood of harm to
any person or other serious harmful consequence.
(b) A judge should not permit broadcasting, televising, electronic recording, or taking photographs of hearings of motions to suppress or to dismiss
or of probable cause or voir dire hearings.
(c) During the conduct of a jury trial, a judge should not permit recording
or close-up photographing or televising of bench conferences, conferences
between counsel, or conferences between counsel and client. Frontal and
close-up photography of the jury panel should not usually be permitted.
(d) A judge should require that all equipment is of a type and positioned
and operated in a manner which does not detract from the dignity and decorum of the proceedirg. Only one stationary, mechanically silent, video
or motion picture camera, and, in addition, one silent still camera should be
permitted in the courtroom at one time. The equipment and its operator
usually should be in place and remain so as long as the court is in session,
and movement should be kept to a minimum, particularly, in jury trials.
(e) A judge should require reasonable advance notice from the news media
of their request to be present to broadcast, to televise, to record electronically, or to take photographs at a particular session. In the absence of such
notice, the judge may refuse to admit them.
(f) A judge may permit, when authorized by rifles of court the use of electronic or photographic means for the presentation of evidence, for the perpetuation of a record, for other purposes of judicial administration, or for
the preparation of materials for educational purposes.
MASSACHUSETTS CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3 A(7); Rules of Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court Rule 3:09, MASSACHUSETTS RULES OF COURT, Desk Copy
(West 1986).
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consideration of the findings and recommendations submitted
by the Advisory Committee appointed to oversee the experiment.3 "
The experimental period commenced in April and June of
1980 for appellate and trial proceedings, respectively. 7 In an
effort to educate the judiciary and the media as to the experimental rules, the Committee distributed the guidelines and additional information to prospective participants in the
experiment prior to beginning the program."
During the
course of the experiment the Committee gathered survey data
from trial participants 369 and detailed reports from judges 370
and court clerks.37 '
In its final report to the Supreme Judicial Court, the Advisory Committee stated four general conclusions. First, the
Committee noted the lack of any serious adverse incidents
while television cameras were present in courtrooms during
the two-year experimental period.3 72 Second, electronic coverage of trials enabled a "much broader public audience" to observe trial proceedings, giving the public "an enhanced
366. See Advisory Committee Report, supra note 364. The fifteen-member Committee was comprised of judges, attorneys and representatives from print and broadcast media. The Supreme Judicial Court also considered comments submitted by
judges at different levels of the state judiciary, including those who presided over
televised trials. Cameras in the Court (press release from the Office of Chief Justice
Edward F. Hennessey, Supreme Judicial Court, Nov. 18, 1982) (available from the
National Center for State Courts, Williamsburg, Va.).
367. News Media Coverage ofJudicialProceedings,supra note 319, at A-44. For an
historical perspective on the Massachusetts experiment, see Connolly & Pierce-Gonzalez, Cameras in the Courtrooms of Massachusetts, 66 MASS. L. REV. 187 (1981).
368. Advisory Committee Report, supra note 364, at 2. The Committee also held a
series of meetings with judges throughout the state to discuss the guidelines and situations which were anticipated to arise during the experiment. Id.
369. The report is unclear as to the number of cases in which questionnaires were
distributed to trial participants. Survey data from one murder trial is discussed in
detail. Id. at 2-3. A total of 69 cases were covered by television, still cameras or radio.
Id. at 4. Fewer than ten trials had substantially full gavel to gavel coverage. Typical
trial coverage consisted of a small amount of footage taken at the beginning of the
trial and used each day during trial in conjunction with oral commentary. Additional
electronic coverage often occurred during sentencing or announcing of the verdict. Id
at 6-7.
370. E.g., Advisory Committee Report, supra note 364, at 3 (citing report of Honorable Roger J. Donahue). The Committee also gathered information from observers of
televised trials and through correspondence with participants of such proceedings. Id
at 4.
371. The court clerks reported on the frequency of television, still cameras and
radio coverage of judicial proceedings and commented on any problems incident to the
coverage. Id. at 3-4.
372. Id. at 1.
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awareness" of the quality of justice administered by the state's
courts.3 73 The report stated that problems which did occur

were minor, could be remedied in the future and were not of
sufficient gravity to justify excluding cameras from the state's
courtrooms.3

74

Finally, the Committee recommended that a

permanent advisory committee be established to help resolve
problems which might arise due to technological and social
changes affecting televised trial coverage. 75 In more specific
recommendations, the Committee recognized the necessity that
the trial judge retain authority to suspend coverage when it appeared that a substantial likelihood of harm to any person or
other serious adverse consequences would follow continued
coverage.76
3. California
California conducted an eighteen-month pilot study of electronic trial coverage in its courtrooms, similar to the experimental programs in Florida and Massachusetts. s 7 Following
the study, and in consideration of a report submitted by a private research firm,3 78 the Judicial Council amended Rule 980 of
the California Rules of Court 379 to permit electronic coverage
of judicial proceedings subject to the consent of the judge.380
373. Id
374. Id. Problems engendered by electronic trial coverage during the experimental period included objectionable frontal close-up photography of the jury in one case,
id. at 4; feared prejudicial pre-trial publicity following electronic coverage of a probable cause hearing in a rape case, id,at 5; failure to follow the experimental guidelines
requiring pooling of media coverage for one trial, id; and inadequate lighting and
electrical facilities in some courtrooms, id. at 5-6.
375. Id at 10.
376. Id.
377. The program commenced on July 1, 1980 and extended beyond the September, 1981 date of the report. The experiment also included coverage of oral arguments
at the Supreme Court of California in September, 1981. Evaluation of California's
Experiment With Extended Media Coverage of Courts 219-20 (Sept. 1981) (available
from the National Center for State Courts, Williamsburg, Va.) [hereinafter Evaluation of California'sExperiment]. For an extended discussion of the electronic coverage of the California Supreme Court, see Turner & Ornstein, supra note 153, at 22.
378. The report, Evaluation of California'sExperiment, supra note 377, was prepared by Ernest H. Short and Assoc., a market research firm, and was submitted to
both the Chief Justice's Special Committee on the Courts and the Media and the California Judicial Council.
379. CAL. RULEs OF COURT § 980 (West 1987).
380. Consent of the accused in criminal proceedings was required during the first
seven months of the experimental period. This requirement was later lifted to enable
more trials to be covered. Evaluationof California'sExperiment, supra note 377, at
219.
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The California experiment included electronic or still photography coverage of over 200 cases,ss including various stages
of cases-arraignments, motions and trialsam The research focused on two key policy issues: 1) whether the physical presence of electronic media equipment and operators caused
disruption or impaired the dignity and decorum of the courtroom, and 2) whether the trial participants' behavior was altered by electronic trial coverage to an extent which
threatened the fair administration of justice.'
Results of the survey data'" showed that "none of the postus
lated disturbance-distraction-decorum effects occurred."
Major findings of the report included the "ordinariness" of
electronic media presence in the courtroom and the lack of extreme behavioral impact.ss As in the experimental program
381. 1d
382. 1& at 220. As with the Massachusetts program, Advisory Committee Report,
supra note 364, pt. 2 at 2, criminal proceedings were also the primary subject of electronic coverage in California's experiment. Evaluation qf California'sEfperiment,
supra note 377, at 220. Few requests were submitted for coverage of appellate or juvenile proceedings. Id The report noted that an (unidentified) libel suit between a
celebrity and a newspaper received extensive electronic coverage. I&
383. Evaluation of California'sExperiment, supra note 377, at 218.
384. Data included in the report was gathered from participant interviews and direct observation by experiment "evaluators." I& at 223. The report analyzed two
types of data. case-specific (trial participants' statements about personal experiences
in specific cases) and attitudinal data (largely opinions as to whether television coverage of certain types of cases is desirable). The report noted that the attitudinal data
was more skeptical than the case-specific data. Id at 224. Shifts in attitude following
experiences with electronic trial coverage were almost always in a direction favorable
to coverage. Id at 224. The study also observed a phenomenon termed "tranference
of responsibility," in which one group of trial participants (jurors, for example) saw
other groups (e.g., witnesses and attorneys) as more negatively affected by electronic
trial coverage than their own group. I& at 225.
385. 1& at 243. Eighty percent of the judges and attorneys interviewed during the
experiment reported no apparent impact on the dignity or decorum of the proceedings. IL at 222. Only ten percent of trial participants found the presence of television
cameras and their operators at all distracting. I The report noted that the implementation of controlled experimental conditions gave little reason "in event after
event" to have any fears about electronic trial coverage. L at 243. The experiment
was described as "highly structured, heavily monitored and tightly controlled." lL
The report asserted that weakening of the rules would invalidate the applicability of
the research results, and cautioned that the favorable conclusions of the study did not
warrant carte blanche access by electronic media coverage or for the media to ignore
the experimental guidelines set out in the rules. I at 244.
386. AL at 243. See also i& at 221 (summaries of the perceived impact on trial participants). One-half of all judge respondents said electronic coverage had virtually no
impact on trial proceedings; one-fifth concluded such coverage had a positive effect.
Another one-fifth felt electronic coverage had both positive and negative effects,
while eight percent found the overall effect to be negative. IL at 223. The study
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conducted in Massachusetts, 8 7 the California report emphasized the important role played by the trial judge to ensure that
electronic coverage is conducted in a manner consistent with
the parties' fair trial rights. 88
C. Experimental Data
The summaries of the programs in Florida, Massachussetts
and California exemplify the favorable results states have obtained from carefully monitored and evaluated experimental
programs permitting electronic trial coverage. 8 9 As discussed
above, "scientific data" cannot be gathered as to the impact of
television coverage of judicial proceedings on the quality of justice rendered in such trials.390 This is true largely because trial
participant behavior cannot be examined with and without the
presence of television cameras for actual proceedings, which occur only once.39 Nevertheless, although not conclusive, the
consistency of data gathered from state experimentation sharpens the otherwise fuzzy picture as to the potential positive and
negative effects of electronic coverage of judicial proceedings.
The data indicate that the advantages of electronic coverage
outweigh potential, and largely unproven, dangers.
Of vast importance is the states' monolithic conclusion that
electronic trial coverage neither significantly detracts from the
dignity and decorum39 2 nor causes physical disruption of courtconcluded: "There seemed little reason, in event after event, to have many fears
about the presence of [electronic] equipment and personnel inside the courtroom,
under the controlled experimental conditions." Id. at 243.
387. See supra note 376 and accompanying text.
388. Evaluation of California's Experiment, supra note 377, at 244. The report
warned that "a mixing of subtle elements" could create problems resulting in injustice. Id.
389. See, e.g., Raker, Camerasand Recorders in Arizona's Trial Courts: An Evaluation of the Experiment (May 1983) (available from the National Center for State
Courts, Williamsburg, Va.); Van Sickle, Final Statistical Report: Cameras in the
Courtroom in Nevada (May 7, 1981) (available from the National Center for State
Courts, Williamsburg, Va.); Cameras in the Courtroom-A Two-Year Review in the
State of Washington (Sept. 11, 1978) (available from the National Center for State
Courts, Williamsburg, Va.); Final Report of the Hawaii State Bar Association Committee on "Camerasin the Courtroom", 17 HAWAII B.J. 4 (1982) [hereinafter Hawaii
Bar Ass'n Report].
390. See supra notes 237-39 and accompanying text.
391. See A Sample Survey, supra note 354, at 6.
392. E.g., id., at § II, pt. Al, § 1, at 2; Evaluation of California'sExperiment,supra
note 377, at 222, 228, 243; Raker, supra note 389, at 20-21; Van Sickle, supra note 389,
at 2-3. Moreover, the Nevada and Florida studies included responses by many trial
participants-including 28% of respondent judges in Nevada-that electronic trial
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room proceedings.

3

Accordingly, participant distraction trace-

able to television cameras and personnel was found to be
minimal. 4 Moreover, the experimental programs have concluded that the psychological impact of the presence of electronic media and corresponding changes in participant behavior
are not of sufficient magnitude to prohibit electronic cover-

age.3 95 Fears that attorneys would play to the cameras and
"grandstand" are largely unsubstantiated.3s

Witnesses indi-

cated some increased nervousness or self-consciousness about
having their testimony televised, but little intimidation or reluctance to testify. 9 7 Problems experienced by jurors as a re-

sult of electronic coverage were due primarily to frontal
depiction of juries by electronic media, rendering individual
coverage enhanced the dignity of the proceedings. A Sample Survey, supra note 354,
at § II, pt. Al, § 1, at 2; Van Sickle, supra note 389, at 2-3.
393. E.g., A Sample Survey, supra note 354, at § II, pt. Al, § 1, at 3; Advisory Committee Report, supra note 364, at 3; Evaluationof California'sExperiment, supra note
377, at 226, 228, 243; Raker, supra note 389, at 20-21; Hawaii Bar Ass'n Report, supra
note 389, at 17; Van Sickle, supra note 389, at 4.
394. E.g., A Sample Survey, supra note 354, at § II, pt. Al, § 1, at 7, 18; Advisory
Committee Report, supra note 364, at Attachment 4, p.1; Evaluation of California's
Experiment, supra note 377, at 221-22, 228, 243; Raker, supra, note 389, at 20-21; Van
Sickle, supra note 389, at 6.
395. E.g., A Sample Survey, supra note 354, at § II, pt. Al, § 1, at 3-7; Advisory
Committee Report, supra note 364, at 3; Evaluationof California'sElperiment,supra
note 377, at 221, 226, 228; HawaiiBar Ass'n Report, supra note 389, at 17; Raker, supra
note 389, at 26-28; Van Sickle, supra note 389, at 2, 4-6. These findings included trial
participants' responses to written survey questions as to whether the presence of electronic media made them more nervous or self-conscious, and observations by trial
participants as to perceived behavioral changes of other participants.
It also bears noting that 40% of the respondent judges in the Arizona study said that
the presence of electronic media during courtroom proceedings caused them to be
more attentive. Raker, supra note 389, at 28. In the Florida program, 34% of respondent court personnel and 54% of respondent attorneys stated that judges were between slightly and extremely more attentive due to the presence of electronic media.
A Sample Survey, supra note 354, at § II, pt. Al, § 3, at 5.
396. E.g., Advisory Committee Report, supra note 364, at Attachment 4, p.1 . Cy A
Sample Survey, supra note 354, at § II, pt. Al, § 2, at 2 (one quarter of responding
court personnel and opposing counsel indicated moderate to extreme flamboyance
caused by the presence of electronic media); Van Sickle, supra note 389, at 6 (56% of
responding judges reported slight to moderate increase in flamboyant conduct by
attorneys).
397. E.g., A Sample Survey, supra note 354, at § II, pt. Al, § 1, at 5-6; Advisory
Committee Report, supra note 364, at Attachment 4, p. 1; Raker, supra note 389, at 26.27; Van Sickle, supra note 389, at 3, 5, 13. A minority of respondent witnesses expressed fear of reprisal caused by television coverage of their testimony. E.g., A Sample Survey, supra note 354, at § II, pt. Al, § 1, at 10; Raker, supra note 389, at 74-75
(one witness wore a wide brimmed hat and dark veil to conceal her identity).
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panel members identifiable by the viewing public.39 8
In contrast to the near absence of perceived negative effects,s the experimental programs reported substantial benefits from electronic coverage. 4° Most significantly, they have
concluded that televised coverage of trials is a necessary tool to
inform the public about the administration of justice4 ' and facilitate enhanced public scrutiny of the judicial process.' 2 It
was observed that direct trial coverage by electronic media increases accuracy of news media portrayal of courts by communicating actual trial proceedings, rather than self-interested
characterizations of the proceedings offered by trial participants in stand-up news conferences. 43 In addition, some states
observed that news coverage of judicial proceedings in general
increased when television cameras were permitted to record
and broadcast proceedings.'
398. E.g., Advisory Committee Report, supra note 364, at 4; Evaluation of California's Experiment,supra note 377, at 231-32; Raker, supra note 389, at 44, 74, 75. This
Note maintains that juror anonymity is a desirable practice. See inkfra text accompanying note 414.
399. See supra notes 392-98 and accompanying text.
400. See supra notes 363 & 373 and accompanying text, and infra notes 401-04 and
accompanying text.
401. E.g., A Sample Survey, supra note 354, at § II, pt. A2, at 3-5; Advisory Committee Report, supra note 364, pt. 1, at 1; HawaiiBar Ass'n Report, supra note 389, at 17;
Raker, supra note 389, at 44. The California report indicated three types of reactions
to the purported educational benefits of televised trial coverage. The largest group of
respondents indicated that the value of televised trial proceedings may be slight
where only small portions of a trial are broadcast, often dubbed over by a reporter's
summary of the proceedings. Evaluation of California'sExperiment,supra note 377,
at 241. This group did feel that even the amount of coverage described was accurate
and fair. Id. A substantial number of respondents "applauded" electronic coverage as
contributing to public knowledge of the judicial system. Id. A small "vocal minority"
expressed skepticism about the television medium's ability to cover the courts fairly
and accurately due to its inherent commercial nature. Id. For example, Calfornia
Supreme Court Justice Stanley Mosk voiced opposition to electronic coverage of the
court's proceedings:
It's regrettable that a majority of the members of this court have yielded to
the persistence of the entertainment medium. As a result, this temple of
justice is being transformed into a theater, and lawyers and justices are to be
the actors. One wonders if the work of this court is now to be evaluated on
the basis of its Nielsen ratings. I hope that upon reflection, the members of
this court will reconsider their ill-advised submission to the entertainment
medium.
Turner & Ornstein, supra note 153, at 24.
402. E.g., Hawaii Bar Ass'n Report, supra note 389, at 17.
403. Id.
404. E.g., Advisory Committee Report, supra note 364, at 7; Raker, supra note 389,
at 55 (television was the most active form of media covering judicial proceedings during Arizona's one-year experimental program).
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VIII
A Proposal For Electronic Trial Coverage in
Federal and State Courts
The foregoing analysis indicates that the per se prohibition of
electronic access to the courtroom is constitutionally untenable.
As any access by the electronic media must accommodate due
process and other protected interests, this Note proposes that
the federal courts and those states currently not allowing coverage on experimental or permanent bases amend provisions
proscribing the broadcasting of trials to authorize a two-year
pilot study similar to those undertaken by various states. 05
The ultimate goal of the proposed program should be to ascertain the appropriate balance between the competing interests.
A.

Access Guidelines

Under the authority of Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,406 Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court,40 and Press
Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, °8 requests by the media to
gain access may be evaluated by the trial judge on a case-bycase basis under the compelling governmental interest standard.40 9 Alternatively, a lesser standard of review-under a
time, place or manner, or analogous analysis-may be applicable.410 In either case, to assure consistency and minimize judicial bias against electronic access, rulemaking authorities in the
participating federal and state court systems should formulate
workable guidelines for making such determinations. These
guidelines should consider: a) the strength of the public interest involved in the case; b) whether the parties to the litigation
consent to the coverage; c) potential dangers posed to the parties; and d) whether the court anticipates the admission of testimony of a sensitive nature. The scope of the proposed coverage
should not be considered. Strict guidelines for equipment
should be utilized.
405. See supra notes 345-88 and accompanying text.
406. 448 U.S. 555, 580-81 (1980).
407. 457 U.S. 596, 606-07 (1982).
408. 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984).

409. See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
410. See supra notes 215-28 and accompanying text.
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The Public Interest

"Public interest" should be defined broadly to favor access in
many different contexts: where there are issues concerning
government activity or the conduct of elected officials; where
issues are inherently public in nature, such as defamation trials
involving public figures and media defendants; where the
court's treatment of a party due to the party's unusually high or
low socio-economic status should be publicly examined; and
other cases where private action involved in the litigation impacts the rights of a large number of people, for example, class
actions, insider trading cases, criminal trials involving corporations accused of defrauding the government or consumers, and
espionage cases.
2. Consent of the Parties
Electronic access should be permitted in virtually all cases
where consent of the parties to the suit is freely given. Yet,
access should not be precluded in cases where consent by all
parties is not given.
3. DangersPosed to Trial Participants
Trial courts permitting electronic access are required to consider potential violations of a criminal defendant's due process
rights.41 1 In addition, courts must look to the impact of such
access on a defendant's physical and mental well-being. 412 Due
process rights of civil litigants must also be protected. 41 3 The
jury should not be covered in a manner which makes individual
jurors identifiable to viewers.41 4
4. Sensitive Testimony
Prohibition of coverage of certain trials or witnesses, upon
specific findings of potential harm, will be justified where family matters, sexual assault, minors as parties or witnesses, infor411. See Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560 (1981), discussed supra notes 64-75 and
accompanying text.
412. See, e.g, Camerasin State and FederalCourtrooms, supra note 113, at 406-08;
Nevas, supra note 15, at 49-50; Zimmerman, supra note 15, at 703. See also PostNewsweek, 370 So.2d at 779 ("qualitative difference" test), discussed supra note 262.
413. Jurisdictions may seek to structure their pilot programs to give additional protection to ensure that the spectre of television coverage of civil trials will not unduly
hinder access to the courts for media shy complainants.
414. See supra notes 255, 340 & 398 and accompanying text.
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mants, undercover agents, trade secrets or classified information are involved.415
5. Scope of Coverage
The extent of the proposed coverage--complete or partial,
live or delayed-should not be a determinative factor. If it
were, the court could easily usurp the press' editorial functions.
Access should not be limited to the trial level, as appellate proceedings are an equally vital aspect of any judicial system. 416
6.

Technical Guidelines

Technical guidelines 4 7 to minimize dangers of physical disruption should be promulgated and strictly enforced. These
guidelines would specify the types of broadcast equipment and
the number and placement of operators allowed in the
courtroom.
7. Burden of Proof
Under the suggested pilot program, the propriety of electronic access should be presumed. Exclusion will be justified
only by a specific articulation of the governmental interests
which would justify denial in a particular case.41 '
B. Appellate Review
A trial judge's decision to prohibit access should be immediately reviewable by an appellate court. Alleged harm to a criminal defendant resulting from coverage would be evaluated
415. See Camerasin State and FederalCourtrooms,supra note 113, at 422-23. For
example, witnesses in the Westmoreland trial disclosing sensitive military or intelligence information would be excluded from coverage. See also supra notes 341-43 and
accompanying text.
416. In addition, threats to due process rights posed by electronic coverage of appellate proceedings are minimal compared to dangers in trial courts. This is true in
part because witnesses and juries are not involved in appellate proceedings. Also,
only questions of law are pertinent and consideration of the parties' briefs and cited
authorities are considered in chambers prior to and after oral argument.
417. See, e.g., Post-Newsweek, 370 So.2d at 792-95.
418. See Cameras in State and FederalCourtrooms,supra note 113, at 418-24. The
author argues that the presumption should be rebutted only when either strong state
interests-such as privacy rights and the interest in protecting and rehabilitating minors- outweigh first amendment interests or when the televising of a trial would
offer no "material advancement" of first amendment interests. The latter circumstance includes coverage of jurors and certain types of witnesses. See also Constitutional ProtectionAgainst Absolute Denial supra note 146, at 1302-03.
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according to the actual prejudice standard of Chandler v.
419
Forda
C. Evaluation
Results of the proposed survey4 ° would then be compiled
and evaluated with respect to its goals: to implement a qualified first amendment right of electronic access to judicial proceedings without sacrificing other constitutionally protected
interests; to gather data to assist in shaping the boundaries of
that right; and to provide a more experienced frame of reference for judges to evaluate the effects of television cameras in
their courtrooms.

Ix
Conclusion
In upholding rules excluding television cameras from federal
courtrooms in United States v. Hastings,42 ' Westmoreland v.
ColumbiaBroadcastingSystem, Inc. 422 and United States v. Edwards,4 3 the respective courts of appeals relegated public observance of matters of broad public importance to second-hand
accounts filtered through third-party reporting. The courts' reliance on Estes v. Texas424 and Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc. 425 to support the position that electronic access

remains outside the parameters of the first amendment is no
longer valid. The United States Supreme Court's more recent
Chandlerv. Florida42 6 decision leaves room for the invalidation
of absolute and inflexible rules of exclusion, especially when
read together with the Court's landmark decisions recognizing
press access rights to judicial proceedings which began with
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia.4
419. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
420. The programs should be evaluated from surveys of both trial participants and
non-interested trial observers who would evaluate coverage of a greater number of
trials than the participant respondents. See, e.g., Advisory Committee Report, supra
note 365; Evaluation of California'sExperiment, supra note 377.
421. 695 F.2d 1278 (11th Cir. 1983).
422. 752 F.2d 16 (2d Cir. 1984).
423. 785 F.2d 1293 (7th Cir. 1986).
424. 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
425. 435 U.S. 589 (1978).
426. 449 U.S. 560 (1981).
427. 448 U.S. 555 (1980). See also Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Ct., 106 S. Ct.
2735 (1986); Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Ct., 464 U.S. 501 (1984); Globe Newspa-
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Cameras can no longer be excluded from the courtroom on
the theory that they cause a variety of harmful effects. A contemporary analysis of the relevant policy considerations points
toward access, not exclusion. The right to broadcast trials demands a thorough first amendment analysis which the respective courts in Chandler,Hastings, Westmoreland and Edwards
declined to undertake. Such an analysis indicates that any per
se ban on electronic access to the courtroom must be struck
down. This invalidation is compelled by consideration of the
modern role of the electronic press in society, advances in technology and the absence of harmful effects of electronic access
as found by the many states permitting access. Finally, the implementation of a two-year pilot study would prove invaluable
in exploring the extent of the first amendment right to broadcast judicial proceedings.

per Co. v. Superior Ct., 457 U.S. 596 (1982). See supra notes 76-90 and accompanying
text.
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